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To what extent are research results influenced by subjective decisions that scientists make as they design 
studies? Fifteen research teams independently designed studies to answer five original research questions 
related to moral judgments, negotiations, and implicit cognition. Participants from two separate large samples 
(total N > 15,000) were then randomly assigned to complete one version of each study. Effect sizes varied 
dramatically across different sets of materials designed to test the same hypothesis: materials from different 
teams rendered statistically significant effects in opposite directions for four out of five hypotheses, with the 
narrowest range in estimates being d = -0.37 to +0.26. Meta-analysis and a Bayesian perspective on the results 
revealed overall support for two hypotheses, and a lack of support for three hypotheses. Overall, practically 
none of the variability in effect sizes was attributable to the skill of the research team in designing materials, 
while considerable variability was attributable to the hypothesis being tested. In a forecasting survey, 
predictions of other scientists were significantly correlated with study results, both across and within 
hypotheses. Crowdsourced testing of research hypotheses helps reveal the true consistency of empirical 
support for a scientific claim. 
 
Keywords: Crowdsourcing, scientific transparency, stimulus sampling, forecasting, conceptual replications, 
research robustness 
  
Scientific theories are meant to be generalizable. They 
organize findings, ideas, and observations into systems of 
knowledge that can make predictions across situations and 
contexts. Theories are more useful when they can explain 
a wider variety of phenomena. Understanding a theory’s 
scope is critical to successfully applying it. In order to be 
generalizable, theories often make use of abstract concepts 
or conceptual variables to organize their hypothesized 
relationships. For instance, cognitive dissonance theory, 
one of the most influential theories in social psychology, 
states that when individuals have inconsistent cognitions, 
they will experience psychological distress or discomfort 
that motivates them to reduce the inconsistency (Festinger, 
1957). This theory makes use of conceptual variables to 
describe its relationships of interest. In particular, 
“cognitions” refer to any of several types of mental 
constructs, including attitudes, beliefs, self-concepts, and 
knowledge that one has engaged in a certain behavior. 
Reducing inconsistency can take many forms, such as 
altering one or both of the cognitions to become consistent, 
or adding new cognitions that resolve the discrepancy. 
These conceptual variables allow researchers to use the 
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theory to make predictions about many different situations 
in which people experience inconsistency. 
Researchers must operationalize abstract and 
conceptual variables into concrete terms for empirical 
testing. For example, to study cognitive dissonance, a 
researcher might identify two cognitions that could 
reasonably be brought into conflict with one another (the 
independent variable). Then, the psychologist could 
identify a way of resolving the conflict to provide to 
participants (the dependent variable). Indeed, 
psychologists have studied cognitive dissonance by 
measuring attitudes toward a boring task after inducing 
some participants to lie to the next participant and say the 
task was exciting (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1957), by 
measuring preferences toward appliances after obliging 
participants to choose between two attractive options to 
receive as a gift (Brehm, 1956), or by assessing interest in 
a study group after undergoing an uncomfortable initiation 
(Aronson & Mills, 1959). Each of these concrete 
operationalizations widens the understood boundaries of 
the conceptual variables involved in an effect and thus the 
generalizability of the effect itself (Schmidt, 2009; Stroebe 
& Strack, 2014).  
Although generalizability is a critical goal of scientific 
research, the standard model of conducting research 
creates many challenges for establishing robust 
generalizability of an effect across contexts. Researchers 
and/or labs often work in isolation or in small groups, 
generating their own hypotheses, measures, and 
operationalizations. These operationalizations represent a 
small subset of the possible, theoretically justifiable 
methods that they could have used to test their hypotheses 
(Baribault et al., 2018; Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2012; 
Monin & Oppenheimer, 2014; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 
2007; Wells & Windschitl, 1999; Westfall, Judd, & Kenny, 
2015). In particular, scientists may use methods that are 
likely to confirm their preconceptions (McGuire, 1973, 
1983; Nickerson, 1998). For example, researchers who 
theorize that moral judgments are intuitive tend to use 
simple and emotionally evocative scenarios, whereas 
researchers who theorize that moral judgments are rooted 
in reasoning tend to use complex stimuli that pit different 
values against each other and stimulate deliberation 
(Monin et al., 2007). Such assumptions may guide which 
operationalizations are used to test hypotheses and 
theories, and divergence across operationalizations may 
then affect which theory is empirically supported.  
After one or a few operationalizations and stimulus 
sets are tested, researchers choose which observations to 
report to the broader scientific community in academic 
journals. There is substantial evidence that scientific 
publishing is biased in favor of positive or statistically 
significant findings, leaving negative and null results 
underreported (Greenwald, 1975; Ioannidis, 2005; 
Ioannidis & Trikalinos 2007; Pfeiffer, Bertram, & 
Ioannidis, 2011; Rosenthal, 1979; Schimmack, 2012; 
Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). Null results are 
important for understanding generalizability because they 
provide insights about where the boundaries of a theory lie; 
nonetheless, the scientific community may be left largely 
unaware of them due to biases in publishing (LeBel, 
McCarthy, Earp, Elson, & Vanpaemel, 2018; Zwaan, Etz, 
Lucas, & Donnellan, 2018). 
After initial observations are reported, other 
researchers may conduct follow-up research. These 
follow-ups have the potential to increase understanding of 
generalizability by inspiring new operationalizations and 
instantiations of effects and theories. Still, scientific 
culture and professional advancement often privilege 
novelty over increased certainty and incremental 
refinement (Everett & Earp, 2015; Giner-Sorolla, 2012; 
Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012), which may disincentivize 
researchers from conducting tests of previously published 
ideas in favor of pursuing new ideas and theories (Makel, 
Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012). Although scientific culture has 
been changing with respect to valuations of replications, 
particularly in psychology, these changes have been more 
focused on direct replications (testing the same idea with 
the same materials and methodology; Alogna et al., 2014; 
Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2014; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015; Pashler & Harris, 2012; Simons, 
2014) than on conceptual replications (testing established 
ideas with a new approach; Crandall & Sherman, 2016; 
Finkel, Eastwick, & Reis, 2015, 2017). Furthermore, failed 
conceptual replications are far more susceptible to 
alternative explanations based on methodological 
differences than are direct replications, and as a 
consequence may be left unpublished or dismissed by 
original researchers and other scientists (Baribault et al., 
2018; Doyen, Klein, Simons, & Cleeremans, 2014; Earp, 
in press; Hendrick, 1990; Schmidt, 2009; Simons, 2014). 
Taken together, these forces within the standard model of 
conducting psychological research may impede tests of 
generalizability of scientific theories and phenomena. The 
standard model may thus stunt theory development by 
limiting contributions to the literature to ones based on a 
relatively small subset of operationalizations, and to 
unrealistically positive results. 
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The Current Research 
To address these challenges, we introduce a 
crowdsourced approach to hypothesis testing. In the 
crowdsourcing initiative reported here, up to 13 research 
teams (out of a total of 15 teams) independently created 
stimuli to address the same five research questions, while 
fully blind to one another’s approaches, and to the original 
methods and the direction of the original results. The 
original hypotheses, which were all unpublished at the time 
the project began, dealt with topics including moral 
judgment, negotiations, and implicit cognition. Large 
samples of research participants were then randomly 
assigned to different teams’ versions of the same study, 
with a commitment to publish the results from all study 
designs as a fundamental component of the project. The 
analyses were also pre-registered, which has been argued 
to reduce bias (Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 
2018; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, 
& Kievit, 2012; Wicherts, Veldkamp, Augusteijn, Bakker, 
Van Aert, & Van Assen, 2016), although a causal effect 
remains to be empirically demonstrated. Comparisons of 
the estimated effect sizes associated with the same 
hypothesis across the studies created by the different teams 
reveal the extent to which the empirical results are 
contingent on the decisions scientists make as they design 
their study. Aggregating results across teams via meta-
analysis, taking into account both average effects and 
variability across teams, provides a systematic assessment 
of the relative strength of support for each hypothesis.  
There are a number of potential benefits to a 
crowdsourcing approach to hypothesis testing. 
Crowdsourcing the operationalization of research ideas 
makes transparent the true consistency of support for an 
empirical prediction, and provides a more stringent test of 
robustness than employing a narrow set of stimuli (Monin 
& Oppenheimer, 2014), directly replicating multiple 
independent and dependent variables that have been used 
previously (Caruso, Shapira, & Landy, 2017), or even the 
innovative approach of radically randomizing features of 
the same basic experimental design (e.g., symbols, colors, 
and presentation speeds in a cognitive priming paradigm; 
Baribault et al., 2018). Rather than varying features of the 
same basic design to address concerns about stimulus 
sampling (Baribault et al., 2018), we had different 
researchers design distinct studies to test the same research 
questions, providing an arguably wider-ranging test of the 
conceptual robustness of each original finding. The extent 
to which divergent approaches produce different results is 
further revealed. Uniquely, the conceptual replications are 
developed by independent research teams with no prior 
knowledge of the original authors’ method or results to 
bias them (Silberzahn et al., 2018; Silberzahn & Uhlmann, 
2015), unlike in the usual practice of science, in which 
conceptual replications are conducted after the 
dissemination of the original results. Materials designers 
also did not know the direction of the original hypotheses 
and results, but were rather provided with a non-directional 
version of each research question (see below).  This was to 
prevent materials designers from constructing materials 
aimed at confirming a directional hypothesis, while not 
giving alternative directional hypotheses a chance (Monin 
et al., 2007).  In other words, we believe that we were more 
concerned with answering the research questions that 
drove the five original, unpublished studies than we were 
with confirming their results. 
Because all crowdsourced conceptual replications 
were pre-registered and reported, this approach is also free 
of reporting bias, unlike traditional conceptual replications 
where null effects may be attributed to departures from the 
original methodology and therefore left unpublished. 
Moreover, because participants from the same large 
sample are randomly assigned to different conceptual 
replications, discrepant results, including “failed” 
replications, cannot be attributed to differences in the 
populations being sampled (McShane, Tackett, 
Böckenholt, & Gelman, 2019; Tiokhin, Hackman, Munira, 
Jemsin & Hruschka, 2019; Van Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, 
Brady, & Reinero, 2016). Heterogeneity in results above-
and-beyond what would be expected based on sampling 
error can confidently be attributed to design choices.  
In the present initiative, we also recruited a second 
large sample and repeated our initial studies with the same 
methodologies and materials. This effort is, to our 
knowledge, the first time an entire crowdsourced set of 
studies has itself been directly replicated. Doing so allowed 
us to simultaneously take into account both conceptual and 
direct replications when assessing the strength of evidence 
for each finding. Altogether, we provide a new framework 
for determining the generalizability and context-
dependency of new findings, with the goal of identifying 
more deeply robust phenomena, which we believe may 
hold utility for select research questions in the future. In 
the Discussion, we elaborate at greater length on when 
crowdsourcing hypothesis tests is likely to prove most (and 
least) useful.   
We additionally examine whether scientists are able to 
predict a priori how design choices impact research 
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results. Prior work has demonstrated that researchers can 
anticipate whether a published result will independently 
replicate based on the research report alone (Camerer et al., 
2016; Dreber et al., 2015), and predict the effects of 
performance interventions starting only from a few 
benchmark effects and the materials for the additional 
treatments (DellaVigna & Pope, 2018a, 2018b). Other 
forecasting studies with scientists have returned more 
mixed results (Coffman & Niehaus, 2014; Dunaway, 
Edmonds, & Manley, 2013; Groh, Krishnan, McKenzie, & 
Vishwanath, 2016; Sanders, Mitchell, & Chonaire, 2015). 
We therefore conducted a forecasting survey asking an 
independent crowd of scientists to attempt to predict the 
results of each study based solely on its sample size, 
methodology, and materials. Notably, all prior work has 
examined forecasting accuracy across different hypotheses 
that vary in their truth value and alignment with empirical 
reality. In contrast, we assessed whether scientists are 
accurate in their beliefs about the outcomes of different 
experiments designed to test the same research question. 
Scientists’ intuitions about the impact of researcher 
choices may or may not map onto the actual downstream 
consequences.  
Method 
Main Studies and Replication Studies 
In two separate data collection efforts (the initial 
investigations [“Main Studies”] and direct replications 
[“Replication Studies”]), we randomly assigned 
participants to different sets of study materials designed 
independently by up to 13 teams of researchers to test the 
same five research questions. There were 15 teams of 
materials designers in total, from which up to 13 teams 
designed materials for each research question (i.e., not all 
teams made materials to test all five original hypotheses). 
The five research questions were gathered by emailing 
colleagues conducting research in the area of moral 
judgment and asking if they had initial evidence for an 
effect that they would like to volunteer for crowdsourced 
testing by other research groups. In three cases 
(Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4), project coordinators volunteered 
an effect from their research program that fit these criteria, 
and in two cases, members of other teams volunteered an 
effect (Hypotheses 2 and 5). In the present research, we 
examined the overall degree of support for each 
hypothesis, and also quantified the heterogeneity across 
 
1 The original study supporting Hypothesis 4 has since been 
published as a supplemental study in Landy, Walco, and Bartels 
(2017).  
different sets of study materials. To our knowledge, this 
instance is the first time a large-scale meta-scientific 
project has itself been directly replicated in full with a new 
sample. All materials, data, and analysis scripts from this 
project are publicly available at https://osf.io/9jzy4/. 
Target hypotheses. We identified five directional 
hypotheses in the areas of moral judgment, negotiation, 
and implicit cognition, each of which had been supported 
by one then-unpublished study.1 Table 1 shows the 
directional hypotheses, as well as the nondirectional forms 
in which they were presented to materials designers. Below 
we elaborate briefly on the theoretical basis for each 
research question.  
Hypothesis 1: Awareness of automatic prejudice. 
Influential dual-process theories of intergroup attitudes 
propose that individuals have both explicit, consciously 
endorsed attitudes towards negatively stereotyped groups, 
and also implicit ones that they may not endorse (Dovidio, 
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 
2000). Rather than in propositional logic, these implicit 
attitudes are based in simple associations (e.g., Black-
Criminal, Female-Weak), that are conditioned by the 
cultural environment (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; 
Uhlmann, Poehlman, & Nosek, 2012). As a result, even 
consciously egalitarian individuals often harbor prejudiced 
associations that may “leak out” and affect their judgments 
and behaviors without them realizing it. Low 
correspondence between self-reported and implicit 
measures of intergroup attitudes has been interpreted as 
indicating a lack of introspective access into the latter 
(Banaji, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Nonetheless, 
people could potentially be aware of their spontaneous 
affective reactions without endorsing them. Indeed, Hahn 
and colleagues (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014; Hahn & 
Gawronski, 2019) provide evidence that people can 
accurately predict their performance on Implicit 
Association Tests of associations with social groups 
(Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Uhlmann and 
Cunningham (2000) constructed questionnaire items 
examining whether individuals directly self-report 
negative gut feelings towards minorities. Representative 
items include “Although I don't necessarily agree with 
them, I sometimes have prejudiced feelings (like gut 
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reactions or spontaneous thoughts) that I don't feel I can 
prevent” and “At times stereotypical thoughts about 
minorities coming into my head without my necessarily 
intending them to.” In the original research, approximately 
three-quarters of undergraduates agreed with such 
statements, and overall endorsement was confirmed by 
mean responses statistically significantly above the neutral 
scale midpoint of four (1= strongly disagree, 4= neutral, 
7= strongly agree). As the Uhlmann and Cunningham 
(2000) investigations were never published, the present 
initiative crowdsourced the question of whether people 
self-report automatic intergroup prejudices, assigning a 
dozen independent research teams to create their own 
awareness measures. Specifically, we examined whether 
the majority of people, without further prompting or 
consciousness-raising, agree on questionnaire measures 
that they harbor such automatic biases towards stigmatized 
groups. 
Hypothesis 2: Extreme offers reduce trust. Negotiators 
are routinely advised to make extreme first offers to benefit 
from the anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
When sellers make extreme first offers, final prices tend to 
be high; in contrast, when buyers make extreme first offers, 
final prices tend to be low (Ames & Mason, 2015; 
Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005; 
Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). Evidence suggests this 
effect is robust across cultures, issues, and power positions 
(Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013). Yet, more 
recent research has examined the conditions under which 
this advice might not be accurate (Loschelder, Swaab, 
Trötschel, & Galinsky, 2014; Loschelder, Trötschel, 
Swaab, Friese, & Galinsky, 2016; Maaravi & Levy, 2017). 
The present Hypothesis 2 explores one mechanism for why 
extreme first offers might backfire in negotiations with 
multiple issues. Specifically, extreme first offers may 
interfere with value creation processes such as trust 
building and information exchange. Building on previous 
research that showed that extreme first offers can cause 
offense and even impasses (Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & 
Pillutla, 2012), Schweinsberg (2013) examined the 
specific hypothesis that extreme first offers lower trust in 
the counterpart. Ultimately, this line of research may show 
that extreme first offers can help negotiators claim a larger 
percentage of the bargaining zone for themselves, but that 
extreme first offers also shrink the overall size of the 
bargaining zone by reducing information exchange and 
trust. Thus, extreme first offers might help negotiators 
claim a larger percentage of a smaller bargaining zone, 
making them ultimately worse off. Negotiators might be 
blind to this extreme first offer disadvantage because their 
salient comparison is between value they claimed versus 
value claimed by their counterpart, and not the more 
relevant but counterfactual comparison between value they 
claimed from an extreme offer versus value they could 
have claimed from a more moderate first offer. The present 
research focuses on just one part of this argument, 
providing crowdsourced tests of the prediction that 
“negotiators who make extreme first offers are trusted less, 
relative to negotiators who make moderate first offers.” 
Hypothesis 3: Moral praise for needless work. It is 
easy to find anecdotal examples in which individuals 
received moral praise for continuing to work despite 
coming into sudden wealth and no longer needing to earn 
a salary (Belsie, 2011). In scenario studies based on such 
real life cases, Americans positively evaluate the moral 
character of individuals with working class occupations 
(e.g., potato peeler in a restaurant kitchen) who continue 
their employment after winning the lottery (Poehlman, 
2007; Uhlmann, Poehlman, & Bargh, 2009). A number of 
sources for such moral intuitions are plausible, among 
these a tendency to value work contributions that parallels 
general disapproval of shirkers and non-contributors 
(Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016), use of work 
behavior as a signal of underlying traits (Uhlmann, Pizarro, 
& Diermeier, 2015), the influence of the Protestant work 
ethic in some cultures (Uhlmann & Sanchez-Burks, 2014), 
and post-materialist value systems in which work is 
pursued for meaning and fulfillment rather than as an 
economic necessity (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 
2005). A separate project to this one examines the extent 
to which these and other work morality effects directly 
replicate across different national cultures (Tierney et al., 
2019a). Of interest to the present initiative is how 
conceptually robust the findings are to alternative study 
designs. We therefore crowdsourced the research question 
of whether working in the absence of material need elicits 
moral praise, limiting our samples to U.S.-based 
participants, the group originally theorized to exhibit these 
effects.   
Hypothesis 4: Proximal authorities drive legitimacy of 
performance enhancers. People in the United States 
express widespread normative opposition to the use of 
Performance-Enhancing Drugs (PEDs), especially among 
competitive athletes, but it is not clear what underpins 
these judgments. While most studies of opposition to PEDs 
have examined perceptions of fairness (e.g., Dodge, 
Williams, Marzell, & Turrisi, 2012; Fitz, Nadler, 
Manogaran, Chong, & Reiner, 2014; Scheske & Schnall, 
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2012), some research also suggests that the sheer fact that 
PEDs are prohibited also contributes to opposition toward 
them (Sattler, Forlini, Racine, & Sauer, 2013). This 
distinction between fairness concerns and explicit rules 
roughly parallels the insight from Social Domain Theory 
(Turiel, 1983; 2002) that acts can be “wrong” in at least 
two qualitatively different ways: moral offenses violate 
universal moral standards like fairness, whereas 
“conventional” offenses violate consensually accepted 
norms or the dictates of legitimate authorities. Landy, 
Walco, and Bartels (2017) investigated whether opposition 
to PED use exhibits properties of conventional offenses by 
manipulating whether or not an athlete’s use of PEDs 
“violates the law and the rules of his [competition] circuit” 
(Study 2 of the original report), and found that this 
manipulation significantly affected people’s judgments of 
how wrong it was for the athlete to use PEDs. A follow-up 
study (Supplemental Study 1 of the original report) found 
that PED use was considered more wrong when it violated 
a dictate of a legitimate proximal authority (the 
competition circuit) than when it violated the law. An 
additional study replicated this finding (Study 12 of the 
original report), but a further study did not (Study 13 of the 
original report), so it is unclear whether proximal authority 
or legal authority contributes more to opposition to PED 
use. Since all of these studies were unpublished at the 
beginning of this project, we applied our crowdsourcing 
methodology to obtain a more definitive answer to this 
question. 
Hypothesis 5: The tendency to make deontological 
judgments is positively correlated with happiness. In order 
to bridge the normative-descriptive divide between the 
fields of philosophical ethics (how should people morally 
behave) and moral psychology (how and why do people 
morally behave) cognitive science must map out how 
variation in moral cognitions are systematically related to 
variances in outcomes related to human flourishing. The 
goal of this original research was to contribute to this 
endeavor by examining how the tendency to make 
utilitarian versus deontological moral judgments (Bentham 
1970/1823; Kahane, 2015; Kant, 1993/1785; Mill, 1861) 
relates to personal happiness and well-being (Kahneman, 
Diener, & Schwarz, 1999; Ryff, 1989; Waterman, 1993). 
The idea that happiness and morality are tightly 
intertwined has a long history in philosophy (see, e.g., 
Annas, 1993; Aristotle, 340 BCE/2002; Foot, 2001; Kraut, 
1979), and recent empirical work suggests that people 
consider moral goodness to be an element of what 
“happiness” consists of (Phillips, Freitas, Mott, Gruber, & 
Knobe, 2017; Phillips, Nyholm, & Liao, 2014). However, 
prior work has not examined the relationship (if any) 
between specific moral orientations and happiness. 
Hypothesis 5 posits that people who are more inclined 
to base their moral judgments on the violation of rules, 
duties, and obligations (deontological judgments) versus 
material outcomes (utilitarian judgments) are also more 
likely to experience happiness in their lives. This 
prediction is based on philosophical and scientific 
evidence that has demonstrated shared psychological and 
neurological mechanisms between these dimensions (e.g., 
Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016; Greene, 2013; 
Lieberman, 2013; Phillips et al., 2017; Singer, 2005). To 
test this hypothesis, Sowden and Hall (2015) asked 
participants to judge several morally questionable 
behaviors that pitted utilitarian and deontological 
considerations against one another (Greene et al. 2001) and 
compared an index of those judgments to how they 
responded to measures of subjective well-being (Diener et 
al., 1985; Watson et al., 1988) and eudaimonic happiness 
(Waterman et al., 2010). The crowdsourced project posed 
the research question to independent researchers, who 
separately designed studies relating moral judgments to 
individual happiness.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Method 
Materials. A subset of the project coordinators 
(Landy, Jia, Ding, Uhlmann) recruited 15 teams of 
researchers through their professional networks to 
independently design materials to test each hypothesis. Of 
these 15 teams, four included the researchers who 
developed the original materials for at least one of the five 
hypotheses. Teams ranged in size from one researcher to 
five, and members ranged in experience from graduate 
students to full professors. We opted not to standardize 
team size because research teams vary greatly in size in the 
natural practice of science (Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007a, 
2007b). All studies were required to be designed to be 
administered in an online survey. Note that recruiting 
through our professional networks would, if anything, be 
expected to bias our results towards homogeneity and 
consistency between materials designers. Likewise, the 
restriction to using only brief, online questionnaires rather 
than behavioral measures, video stimuli, or elaborate 
laboratory experiments with a cover story and research 
confederates, also artificially constrains variability in study 
designs. Yet, as we detail below, we still observed 
remarkable heterogeneity in results. 
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To avoid biasing their designs, materials designers 
were provided with the non-directional versions of the five 
hypotheses presented in Table 1, and developed materials 
to test each hypothesis independently of the other teams. 
The team of Xu and Yang designed materials only for 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 5, and the team of Cimpian, Tworek, 
and Storage designed materials only for Hypotheses 3 and 
4. We also included the original materials from the 
unpublished studies that initially supported each 
hypothesis and conducted direct replications with them; 
the teams of Uhlmann, Schweinsberg, and Uhlmann and 
Cunningham only contributed these original materials. The 
original materials for Hypothesis 5 were developed by the 
team of Sowden and Hall, but were much longer than any 
other materials set, so this team also developed a shorter 
set of materials for Hypothesis 5 and data were collected 
using both versions. In all, 64 sets of materials, including 
the five sets of original materials, were created through this 
crowdsourced process. The materials and analyses for both 
studies were pre-registered at https://osf.io/9jzy4/ (see also 
Supplement 1, as well as Supplement 2 for deviations from 
the pre-registered analyses).  
Participants. In total, 8,080 participants located in the 
United States began the Main Studies on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 
2014, Chandler, Paolacci, & Mueller, 2013); of these, 
7,500 completed the entire study. In accordance with our 
pre-registered stopping rule (see https://osf.io/avnuc/), we 
ceased data collection after N = 7,500 participants finished 
the survey. In the Replication Studies, 7,500 English-
speaking adult participants located in the United States 
were recruited via PureProfile, a survey firm – we 
employed this different sampling method for the 
Replication because, in the Main Studies, we had already 
essentially exhausted the number of Mechanical Turk 
participants that a typical lab samples (see Stewart et al., 
2015). In both data collection efforts, responses from 
participants who completed their assigned materials for 
one or more hypotheses but did not complete the all 
assigned materials in their entirety were retained, resulting 
in slightly different sample sizes across the five hypotheses 
(Main Studies: Hypothesis 1 N = 7,175; Hypothesis 2 N = 
7,160; Hypothesis 3 N = 7,146; Hypothesis 4 N = 7,158; 
Hypothesis 5 N = 7,758; Replication Studies: Hypothesis 
1 N = 7,586; Hypothesis 2 N = 7,631; Hypothesis 3 N = 
7,568; Hypothesis 4 N = 7,576; Hypothesis 5 N = 8,231). 
On a per-cell basis, there were approximately 300 
participants for Hypotheses 1–4, and 600 participants for 
Hypothesis 5 (which was tested using a Pearson 
correlation, rather than a comparison between 
experimental groups). 
Procedure. In the Main Studies, participants were 
randomly assigned to one set of materials for each of the 
five hypotheses, and, for designs with multiple conditions, 
one condition per hypothesis. The order in which the five 
sets of materials were presented was randomized for each 
participant. After responding to all five sets of materials, 
participants completed a demographics questionnaire 
including questions about their age, gender, and other 
characteristics. Additionally, a separate subsample of 
participants was randomly assigned to only complete the 
full original materials for Hypothesis 5, due to their length. 
The materials designed by the team of Jiménez-Leal and 
Montealegre to test Hypothesis 4 were run separately 
approximately two months after the rest of Main Studies 
were run, because we discovered that, due to a coding 
error, one of the two conditions from these materials was 
not presented to participants in the original run (new data 
were therefore collected for both conditions of this design). 
The procedure for the Replication Studies was essentially 
identical to that of the Main Studies; the only modifications 
were fixing the aforementioned condition missing from 
Hypothesis 4, and pre-registering some exploratory 
analyses conducted on the data from the Main Studies (see 
Supplement 2), this time as confirmatory tests (see 
https://osf.io/8s69w/). 
Forecasting Study 
The online Forecasting Study was open to any 
scientist, and had two purposes. First, it tested the extent to 
which researchers (N = 141) were able to predict the results 
of the Main Studies and Replication Studies, in terms of 
the standardized effect size that would be obtained from 
each set of materials, and also with regard to statistical 
significance (the likelihood that a p-value below .05 would 
be found). Second, it determined how independent 
reviewers evaluate each set of materials based on whether 
it provides an adequate test of the original hypothesis. 
Variability across different study versions is far more 
meaningful if they provide valid tests of the original 
research idea. We placed half of the forecasters at random 
into a monetarily incentivized version of the survey; 
potential payoff ranged between $0 and $60, meaning 
financial incentives were present in the treatment condition 
but not strong. Further methodological details for the 
forecasting survey can be found in Supplements 3 and 5, 
and the pre-registration can be found at 
https://osf.io/9jzy4/.  
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Results 
Main Studies and Replication Studies 
Given our key theoretical question regarding 
heterogeneity in estimates, as well as large sample sizes 
that might render even small and theoretically 
uninteresting differences statistically significant, our 
primary focus is on dispersion in effect sizes across 
different study designs. Yet, since the p < .05 threshold is 
widely used as the lower bound criterion for concluding 
the presence of an effect, we likewise examined patterns of 
statistical significance, both at the level of individual 
designs and aggregated across them. This reliance on both 
effect sizes and statistical significance levels to quantify 
the project results was pre-registered in advance. Because 
of the potential issues associated with relying on statistical 
significance to draw conclusions, we report the results of 
null hypothesis significance tests in Supplement 9, and 
focus here on the analyses of effect sizes.  
Meta-analytic statistics. To examine the support for 
each hypothesis, as well as the variation across study 
designs for each of them, we computed effect size 
estimates for the results from each of the 64 sets of 
materials. The diversity in effect size estimates from 
different study designs created to test the same theoretical 
ideas constitute the primary output of this project. For 
Hypotheses 1-4, the effect sizes were independent-groups 
Cohen’s ds, and for Hypothesis 5, they were Pearson rs. 
Effect size estimates and sampling variances were 
calculated via bootstrapping, using the bootES package for 
R (Kirby & Gerlanc, 2013)2, then combined in random-
effects meta-analyses using the metafor package 
 
2 Materials designed by the team of Donnellan, Lucas, Cheung, 
and Johnson for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 employed within-
subjects designs, whereas the other materials for these 
hypotheses employed one-sample or between-subjects designs. 
To ensure that all effect sizes were comparable in the meta-
analyses, the repeated-measures ds for the within-subjects 
designs were converted to independent-groups ds (see Morris & 
DeShon, 2002). bootES does not have a feature to convert 
between effect size metrics, so custom bootstrapping code was 
used (see https://osf.io/avnuc/). This custom code returns the 
same effect size estimates and variance terms for the repeated-
measures ds as bootES, and converts the repeated-measures ds 
to independent-groups ds according to Equation 11 in Morris 
and DeShon (2002). 
3 Fixed-effects models showed similar estimated mean effect 
sizes. In the Main Study, the point estimate was not statistically 
significant for Hypothesis 1, p = .093, and was statistically 
significant for Hypothesis 4, p < .001. In the Replication, the 
estimated effect sizes were again similar when fixed-effects 
models were used, but the point estimates for Hypotheses 1 and 
4 were statistically significant, p < .001. Yet, fixed-effects 
(Viechtbauer, 2010), to obtain an overall estimate for the 
size of each hypothesized effect.3 This model treats each 
observed effect size yi as a function of the average true 
effect size µ, between-study variability, ui ∼ N(0, τ2), and 
sampling error, ei ∼ N(0, vi) (see Viechtbauer, 2010)4: 
 
yi = µ + ui + ei 
 
The heterogeneity among effect sizes (τ2) was 
estimated using Restricted Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation. Positive effect sizes indicate results consistent 
with the original, unpublished findings, whereas negative 
effect sizes indicate results in the opposite direction. 
Figures 1a–1e present forest plots of the observed effect 
sizes in these analyses. For ease of comparison across the 
five figures, the Pearson r effect sizes for Hypothesis 5 
have been converted to Cohen’s ds (Rosenthal & 
DiMatteo, 2001). The top panel of each figure presents 
observed effect sizes and the estimated mean effect size 
from the Main Studies, and the middle panel presents 
observed effect sizes and the estimated mean effect size 
from the Replication Studies. Beneath these panels, the 
estimated mean effect size for each hypothesis, computed 
by combining all individual effect sizes in the Main Studies 
and Replication Studies (k = 26 for Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 
5; k = 24 for Hypothesis 4) is presented. The bottom panel 
presents effect sizes computed by meta-analytically 
combining the Main Studies’ and Replication Studies’ 
effect sizes for each set of materials (i.e., this panel 
presents the results of 12 or 13 meta-analyses, each with k 
= 2 studies).5 
models are not generally recommended when meta-analyzing 
studies with different methods (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2010; Hunter & Schmidt, 2000), so we focus on the 
random-effects models. 
4This analytic approach is not ideal, because it ignores the 
multivariate nature of the data: each hypothesis can be thought 
of as a separate outcome variable. It also ignores the multilevel 
nature of the data (designs are nested within hypotheses), and 
individual-level correlations across designs resulting from the 
fact that each participant completed up to five different study 
designs. We therefore also ran a one-stage multivariate meta-
analysis on our individual participant data to model these 
aspects of the data. The results are very similar to the reported 
univariate meta-analyses, and this approach has its own 
disadvantages, particularly that analysis of heterogeneity jointly 
across outcomes jointly is complicated by the non-nested 
participant design (see Supplement 8). Therefore, we focus here 
on the more familiar analytic approach. 
5 When meta-analytically combining the Main Studies’ and 
Replication Studies’ effect sizes for each individual set of 
materials, we employed fixed-effects models, unlike in the rest 
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[INSERT FIGURES 1A-E ABOUT HERE] 
In the Main Studies, these analyses showed a 
statistically significant aggregated effect in the expected 
direction for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 5 (estimated mean effect 
sizes: d = 1.04, 95% CI [0.61, 1.47], p < .001; d = 0.33, 
95% CI [0.17, 0.50], p < .001; r = .06, 95% CI [0.01, 0.11], 
p = .010), and no statistically significant aggregated effect 
as expected under Hypotheses 1 and 4 (d = 0.07, 95% CI 
[-0.22, 0.37], p = .623; d = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.20], p = 
.269). Note that in the case of Hypothesis 5, the aggregated 
estimate was very small, and the threshold for statistical 
significance may only have been crossed due to the large 
sample and the resultant high power to detect even trivially 
small effects. In the Replication Studies, the patterns of 
results were similar, though the estimated mean effect sizes 
tended to be somewhat smaller, overall. Hypotheses 2 and 
3 (d = 0.60, 95% CI [0.32, 0.88], p < .001; d = 0.24, 95% 
CI [0.11, 0.38], p < .001) were associated with a 
statistically significant effect in the expected direction. 
Hypothesis 5 did not receive statistically significant overall 
support in the Replication Studies (r = .03, 95% CI [-.04, 
.09], p = .417), though the estimated mean effect size was 
not meaningfully different than in the Main Studies.  
Consistent with the Main Studies, Hypotheses 1 and 4 were 
again not supported (d = -0.07, 95% CI [-0.33, 0.19], p = 
.588; d = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.19], p = .465). Overall, 
then, the meta-analytic results were largely consistent 
across the Main Studies and the Replication Studies, 
reflecting overall support for Hypotheses 2 and 3, and an 
overall lack of support for Hypotheses 1, 4, and 5. Similar 
results were found when relying on null hypothesis 
significance testing (see Supplement 9). 
Just as importantly, inspection of the forest plots 
suggests substantial variation among effect sizes, even 
within the same hypothesis. We assessed this more 
formally by examining the Q, I2, and τ2 statistics in each 
meta-analysis (Huedo-Medina, Sánchez-Meca, Marín-
Martínez, & Botella, 2006). The Q statistic is a test for 
heterogeneity - a significant Q statistic means that 
heterogeneity in true effects can be expected. Because all 
participants in each study were drawn from the same large 
online sample and randomly assigned to conditions, it is 
unlikely that heterogeneity can be attributed to hidden 
moderators (e.g., different populations being sampled, 
different study environments, etc., see Van Bavel et al., 
2016), and thus is likely due to differences in the materials. 
 
of our meta-analytic models. This is because the two effect 
sizes being combined come from studies with identical 
The I2 statistic quantifies the percentage of variance among 
effect sizes attributable to heterogeneity, rather than 
sampling variance. By convention, I2 values of 25%, 50%, 
and 75% indicate low, moderate, and high levels of 
unexplained heterogeneity, respectively (Higgins, 
Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). Yet, Q and I2 are also 
sensitive to sample size; large samples tend to produce 
large and significant Q statistics and large I2 values. 
Therefore, we also report the τ2 statistic as an absolute 
measure of the amount of heterogeneity in our data. The τ2 
statistic is an estimate of the variance of true effect sizes 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). All five 
hypotheses showed statistically significant and high levels 
of heterogeneity in the Main Study and the Replication (see 
Table 2). In the Main Study, only about 1%, 2%, 6%, 12%, 
and 24% of the variance across the effect sizes for 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively, can be attributed 
to chance variation. Similarly, in the Replication, we 
would only expect to observe about 1%, 3%, 9%, 22%, and 
14% of the variance across the effect sizes for Hypotheses 
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively, by chance. The vast majority 
of observed variance across effect sizes in both studies is 
unexplained heterogeneity. Moreover, the τ2 statistics are 
rather large, relative to the estimated mean effect sizes, 
suggesting that these large I2 values are not simply due to 
our large effect sizes resulting in low sampling variance - 
there are meaningful levels of absolute heterogeneity in 
our data. One can also see this pattern simply by visually 
inspecting the forest plots (Figures 1a-1e), which show 
considerable dispersion among effect sizes. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Explaining heterogeneity in effect sizes. We 
therefore sought to explain this observed heterogeneity. 
First, we computed intraclass correlation coefficients 
(ICCs) predicting observed effect sizes from the 
hypothesis they tested, and the team that designed the 
materials (see Klein et al., 2014, for a similar analysis). In 
order to compare across all observed effect sizes, the 
Pearson rs from Hypothesis 5 were converted into Cohen’s 
ds (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001), as above. In the Main 
Studies, the hypothesis being tested was moderately 
predictive of observed effect sizes, ICC = .40, 95% CI [.15, 
.86], whereas team did not explain statistically significant 
variance, ICC = -.13, 95% CI [-.23, .09]. The negative ICC 
for team indicates that between-team variance is lower 
than within-team variance. This means that which team 
materials and methods, so they should, in principle, be 
measuring the same true population effect size. 
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designed a set of materials had no predictive relationship 
with the observed effect size (see Bartko, 1976). In other 
words, some teams were not “better” than others at 
designing study materials that produced large effect sizes 
across hypotheses. We followed up this analysis with a 
random-effects meta-regression, predicting effect sizes 
from hypothesis and team, with the median hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 5, in the Main Study) and the median team 
(Sowden & Hall) as the reference levels. Hypothesis 2 
produced statistically significantly larger effect sizes than 
the median hypothesis, β = 0.85, 95% CI [0.47, 1.23], p < 
.001, but, consistent with the analysis above, no team 
produced statistically significantly larger or smaller effect 
sizes than the median team, ps > .086. Moreover, after 
accounting for both hypothesis and team, there was still 
substantial and statistically significant residual 
heterogeneity across effect sizes, Q(44)= 1291.64, p < 
.001, I2= 97.39%, 95% CI [96.22, 98.40], τ2 = 0.24, 95% 
CI [0.16, 0.38]. In the present research, the subjective 
choices that researchers make in stimulus design have a 
substantial impact on observed effect sizes, but if a 
research team produces a large effect size for one research 
question, it does not necessarily mean that they will 
produce a large effect size for another question. This 
pattern fails to support the hypothesis that some 
researchers have a “flair” for obtaining large and 
statistically significant results (see, e.g., Baumeister, 
2016). Still, more research is needed on this point, since 
other research topics (e.g., stereotype threat, motivated 
reasoning), or more finely parsed subtopics, may yet yield 
evidence for expertise effects in conducting conceptual 
replications.6  
As might be expected, independent ratings of the 
quality of each study design (assessed in the Forecasting 
Study) were positively correlated with the obtained results. 
Higher quality sets of materials yielded larger observed 
effect sizes in the direction predicted by each original 
hypothesis (Cohen’s ds), r(62) = .31, p = .012. Thus, it is 
possible that the inclusion of low-quality materials biases 
our analyses against finding support for hypotheses that are 
in fact true, when properly tested. We therefore repeated 
all of the meta-analytic analyses above, excluding 18 sets 
of materials that were rated as below 5 on a scale of 0 (not 
at all informative) to 10 (extremely informative) by 
 
6 We also re-ran these analyses, restricting the data to 
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, which are clearly within the same 
general area of research, moral psychology, to see if we could 
find support for the flair hypothesis within a particular area of 
independent raters in the Forecasting Study. As described 
in greater detail in Supplement 6, the results were 
substantively quite similar for all five hypotheses. 
It is also possible that rather than artificially reducing 
the degree of observed support for a given hypothesis, 
lower quality materials introduce psychometric artifacts 
such as poor reliability and validity which bias effects 
toward zero. We therefore further examined whether 
quality ratings predict larger effect size estimates in 
absolute terms, in other words larger estimates either 
consistent or inconsistent with the original hypothesis. 
Independent ratings of the quality of each study design 
were directionally positively correlated with the absolute 
value of the effect size estimates, but this relationship was 
not statistically significant, r(62) = .20, p = .12. Overall, 
the results suggest that the observed variability in effect 
sizes was not driven by a subset of lower quality study 
designs.   
Aggregating results of the Main Studies and 
Replication Studies. Leveraging the combined samples of 
the Main Studies and Replication Studies allowed for more 
precise effect size estimates from each study version, as 
well as higher-powered estimates of the overall degree of 
support for each of the five original hypotheses. 
Aggregating all of the effect sizes across the two studies in 
random-effects meta-analyses (k = 26 for Hypotheses 1, 2, 
3, and 5; k = 24 for Hypothesis 4) produced similar results 
to the separate meta-analyses above. Hypotheses 2 and 3 
were supported (d = 0.82, 95% CI [0.55, 1.08], p < .001; d 
= 0.29, 95% CI [0.18, 0.39], p < .001). Hypothesis 5 was 
also associated with a statistically significant estimate in 
the expected direction, though, as above, the effect was 
negligible in size (r = .04, 95% CI [.01, .08], p = .026), 
leading to the conclusion that H5 was not empirically 
supported by the crowdsourced initiative. Later we report 
a Bayesian analysis casting further doubt on Hypothesis 5. 
Even under the null hypothesis significance testing 
framework, Hypotheses 1 and 4 were not supported (d = 
0.00, 95% CI [-0.19, 0.19], p = .997, and d = 0.05, 95% CI 
[-0.02, 0.13], p = .179). We repeated these analyses 
selecting only study versions rated as 5 or above in 
informativeness by the independent raters, (see 
Supplement 6), and nesting study (Main Studies versus 
Replication Studies) within each hypothesis (see 
research. Once again, however, we found no evidence that 
observed effect sizes are predicted by the identity of the 
researchers that designed the materials (see Supplement 9 for 
details). 
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Supplement 9). Both of these additional analyses produced 
qualitatively similar results to the results above. 
Comparing the results of the Main Studies and 
Replication Studies. As there is no single approach to 
determining whether an effect directly replicated or not 
(Brandt et al., 2014; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), 
we pre-registered a number of criteria for whether the 
results of the Main Studies held up in the Replication 
Studies. These included correlating the Main Studies’ and 
Replication Studies’ effect sizes, comparing the statistical 
significance levels and direction of effects, and testing for 
statistically significant differences between the effect sizes 
from the Main Studies and the corresponding effect sizes 
from the Replication Studies. We further examined 
whether the effect was statistically significant after meta-
analyzing across both the Main Studies and Replication 
Studies (see Figures 1a-1e), and we report a Bayesian 
analysis of differences in the Main Study and Replication 
results in Supplement 7.  
Each of these criteria is an imperfect and incomplete 
measure of replication. For instance, a near perfect 
correlation in effect sizes could emerge even if replication 
effect sizes were dramatically smaller, so long as the rank 
ordering of effects remained consistent. Given such a 
pattern, it would be unreasonable to conclude the effects 
were robust and replicable. When it comes to comparing 
whether the replication effect is statistically significantly 
different from the original effect or not, this method is low 
in informational value when an original study has a 
statistically significant p-value close to .05 with a lower 
bound of the confidence interval close to zero. With this p-
value, it is highly unlikely to find a statistically significant 
difference from the original result unless the replication 
point estimate is in the opposite direction of the original 
finding.  
With these caveats in mind, we turn to comparing the 
results from the Main Studies and Replication Studies. In 
51 out of 64 cases (80%), the Replication Studies’ effect 
was directionally consistent with the effect from the Main 
Studies’. In 36 of those 51 cases (71%), when new 
participants were run using the same study design, 
statistically significant results were again statistically 
significant in the same direction, and non-significant 
effects were again non-significant. Further, 13 of 44 (30%) 
statistically significant findings from the Main Studies 
were not statistically significant in the Replication Studies. 
At the same time, 6 of 20 (30%) non-significant findings 
from the Main Studies were statistically significant in the 
Replication Studies.  
We next examined whether effect sizes were 
significantly different in size between the two studies. We 
conducted z-tests comparing each team-by-hypothesis 
combination across the two studies (e.g., Team 5’s 
materials for Hypothesis 1 from the Main Studies, versus 
Team 5’s materials for Hypothesis 1 from the Replication 
Studies). Replication Studies’ effect sizes were statistically 
significantly smaller than the corresponding effect in the 
Main Studies, according to z-tests, in 21 out of 64 cases, 
and statistically significantly larger in just one case, with 
no significant difference in 42 out of 64 cases. This pattern 
agrees with the qualitative observation above that effect 
sizes tended to be somewhat smaller in the Replication 
Studies than in the Main Studies. This was quite 
unexpected – if anything, we anticipated that Mechanical 
Turk, as the less expensive, more expedient data source, 
might potentially yield smaller effect sizes. We can only 
speculate that the general decline effect across the two 
samples resulted from the slightly different populations of 
online respondents that were sampled, but the precise 
difference between the two samples that drove this result 
is unclear. 
When directly replicated, a substantial minority of 
individual effect sizes reversed direction, changed 
significance levels across the p < .05 threshold, or were 
statistically significantly different from the initial result. At 
the same time, correlating the 64 effect sizes obtained in 
the Main Studies with the 64 effect sizes from the 
Replication Studies revealed very high correspondence 
between them in the aggregate, r(62) = .92, 95% CI [.88, 
.95], p < .001 (see Figure 2). Moreover, descriptively, the 
major overall findings from our Main Studies emerged in 
the Replication Studies as well. Effect sizes were again 
radically dispersed, with statistically significant effects in 
opposing directions obtained from different sets of 
materials designed to test three of the five research 
questions. Meta-analyzing across study versions, 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 were again supported, and Hypotheses 
1 and 4 were not. The directional and statistically 
significant, but very small estimate for Hypothesis 5 in the 
Main Studies was not statistically significant in the 
Replication Studies, yet also not meaningfully different in 
size (Gelman & Stern, 2006). Variability in effect sizes 
was again far more attributable to whether the hypothesis 
itself enjoyed overall support than to the skill of particular 
research teams at designing studies that returned large 
effects (see Supplement 9). 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Publication bias analyses. We present funnel plots 
and the results of Egger’s test (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & 
Minder, 1997) for all of our meta-analytic results in 
Supplement 9. Because all of the study designs are 
reported in this article, there is, by definition, no 
publication bias in the results we have reported. Yet, we 
did find evidence of funnel plot asymmetries for 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 5. As we discuss in greater detail in 
Supplement 9, these must reflect “sample size effects” that 
are idiosyncratic to the designs tested in this research. This 
result highlights one further advantage of crowdsourcing 
in comparison to the traditional practice of science: In a 
traditional meta-analysis of multiple studies conducted at 
different times, one cannot be certain whether funnel plot 
asymmetries reflect publication bias or some other sample 
size effect (see, e.g., Deeks, Macaskill, & Irwig, 2005), 
whereas in a crowdsourced project like this one, there is, 
by the very nature of the design, no publication bias. 
Bayesian perspective on the results. Supplement 7 
provides an extended report of Bayesian analyses of the 
overall project results (the pre-registered analysis plan is 
available at https://osf.io/9jzy4/). To summarize briefly, 
the Bayesian analyses find compelling evidence in favor of 
Hypotheses 2 and 3, moderate evidence against Hypothesis 
1 and 4, and strong evidence against Hypothesis 5. Overall, 
two of five original hypotheses were confirmed 
aggregating across the different study designs. This pattern 
is generally consistent with the frequentist analyses 
reported above, with the exception that the frequentist 
approach suggests a very small but statistically significant 
(p < .05) effect in the direction predicted by Hypothesis 5 
after aggregating across the different study designs, 
whereas the Bayesian analyses find strong evidence 
against this prediction. The project coordinators, original 
authors who initially proposed Hypothesis 5, as well as 
further authors on this article concur with the Bayesian 
analyses that the effect is not empirically supported by the 
crowdsourcing hypotheses tests project, due to the small 
estimate of the effect, and heterogeneity across designs. 
Regarding the main meta-scientific focus of this initiative, 
namely variability in results due to researcher choices, for 
all five hypotheses strong evidence of heterogeneity across 
different study designs emerged in the Bayesian analyses. 
Forecasting Survey 
We set up the forecasting survey to test if scientists' 
predictions about the effect sizes and statistical 
significance levels (whether p < .05 or not) associated with 
the different sets of study materials would be positively 
correlated with the realized outcomes. Note that in asking 
forecasters to predict statistical significance levels, we are 
not endorsing the idea that something magical happens at 
p =.05, or the binary assumption of there being a result if p 
< .05 and none if p > .05 (Greenland, 2017). Yet, given that 
in many fields and journals this criterion is used to indicate 
the minimum support required to claim an effect (see 
McShane & Gelman, 2017), we find that it is interesting to 
see whether a crowd of researchers can predict this binary 
outcome. 
In addition, we tested whether monetary incentives or 
individual characteristics of the forecasters increased the 
accuracy of the predictions. The planned analyses for the 
forecasting study are detailed at https://osf.io/9jzy4/. 
Standard errors are clustered at two non-nested levels in all 
the regressions employing individual-level data: individual 
level and team-hypothesis version level (i.e., the level of a 
single study). Double clustering renders estimates robust 
to potential violations of independence among forecasts 
generated by the same individual over different versions of 
the study materials, and among predictions about the same 
set of study materials generated by different researchers. 
Overall accuracy. To test our primary hypotheses 
regarding the accuracy of scientists’ predictions, we 
examined whether there existed positive correlations 
between scientists’ forecasts and the estimated effect sizes 
and statistical significance levels (p < .05 or not) from the 
different study versions in the Main Studies, at the team-
hypothesis version level. In addition, we performed paired 
t-tests on aggregated prediction data and observed effect 
sizes to test whether scientists generally underestimated or 
overestimated the strength of each finding. As 
hypothesized, we observed a positive correlation between 
scientists’ forecasts and the results being statistically 
significant in the predicted direction, r(62) = 0.59, 95% CI 
[0.40, 0.73], p < .001. The correlation between scientists’ 
predictions and the observed effect sizes was likewise 
statistically significant: r(62) = 0.71, 95% CI [0.56 ,0.81], 
p < .001.  
[INSERT FIGURES 3A AND 3B ABOUT HERE] 
We tested whether scientists underestimated or 
overestimated the realized outcomes by employing paired 
t-tests between the vector collecting the average forecasts 
and the vectors collecting the effect sizes and directional 
statistical significance of each study version. 
Descriptively, for both effect sizes and directional 
statistical significance, predictions and outcomes were 
fairly aligned, with no differences reaching statistical 
significance. For directional statistical significance in 
terms of p < .05, the mean of the observed outcomes is M 
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= 0.58 (SD = 0.50) and the mean of the forecasted 
outcomes is M = 0.48 (SD = 0.09), t(63) = -1.78, 95% CI 
of the difference of the means [-0.21, 0.01], p = .080. For 
effect sizes, the mean of the observed outcomes is M = 0.31 
(SD = 0.56) and the mean of the forecasted outcomes is M 
= 0.25 (SD = 0.10), t(63) = -1.02, 95% CI of the difference 
of the means [-0.19, 0.06], p = .311. Evidence from the 
analysis of the forecasting survey supports the hypothesis 
that scientists’ predictions are positively correlated with 
the realized outcomes, both in terms of effect sizes and in 
terms of whether the result is statistically significant or not 
for the different sets of study materials. Moreover, the 
analysis shows no evidence of systematic underestimation 
or overestimation of the realized outcomes. 
Sensitivity to design choices. To test if forecasters 
were sensitive to how different versions of the materials 
designed to test the same hypotheses affect research 
outcomes, we ran individual level regressions. These 
analyses tested whether scientists could predict results 
within each hypothesis, rather than only across them. The 
outcome (realized statistical significance in terms of p < 
.05, observed effect size) was the dependent variable and 
the individual prediction was the independent variable. As 
for all other individual level regressions, the standard 
errors were clustered at two non-nested levels: individual 
level (to account for the fact that each individual made 
several forecasts) and team-hypothesis version level (to 
account for the fact that the forecasts about the same set of 
materials might possibly be correlated). The model was 
estimated with either hypothesis fixed effects (exploiting 
only the variation in predictions across teams, as shown in 
equations (1a) and (1b)) or team fixed effects (exploiting 
only the variation in predictions across hypotheses, as 
shown in (2a) and (2b)).  
(1a) SSth = β0 + β1xith + Hyph + εith 
(1b) EEth = β0 + β1x̂ith + Hyph + εith 
 
The dependent variables SSth and EEth are the realized 
outcomes, the dummy variable being positive if the study 
is statistically significant in (1a), and realized effect size in 
(1b), respectively. The independent variables are the 
individuals’ forecasts, xith for the predictions regarding 
statistical significance in terms of p < .05 and x̂ith for the 
 
7 In all four models, there was a statistically significant 
association between individual forecasts and outcomes. This is 
true for both the predictions regarding whether the study will 
find a statistically significant effect in the hypothesized 
direction and the predictions regarding the realized effect size. 
predictions regarding effect size. Hyph identify the 
hypothesis fixed effects, and Teamt are the team fixed 
effects.  
(2a) SSth = β0 + β1xith + Teamt + εith 
(2b) EEth = β0 + β1x̂ith + Teamt + εith 
 
Separately including only hypothesis or only team 
fixed effects allows us to test if the forecasts are associated 
with the realized outcomes using only the variation in 
forecasts within hypotheses (making predictions for the 
different teams within hypotheses) or only the variation in 
forecasts within teams (making predictions for the 
different hypotheses within teams). 
The individual prediction coefficient was statistically 
significant in the expected direction in both the regressions 
with only hypothesis fixed effects, and in the regressions 
with only team fixed effects. This holds for predicting both 
statistical significance levels (β1 = .148, t(9018) = 4.07, p 
< .001 controlling for hypotheses, β1 = .255, t(9007) = 4.38, 
p < .001 controlling for teams), and effect sizes (β1 = 0.097, 
t(9018) = 2.16, p = .031 controlling for hypotheses, β1 = 
0.228, t(9007) = 2.68, p = .007 controlling for teams), and 
shows that forecasters were able to anticipate results from 
different teams of materials designers within each 
hypothesis, as well as different hypotheses within each 
team of materials designers. For completeness, we also 
estimated the results without any fixed effects (β1 = 0.309, 
t(9022) = 43.04 for predictions on whether the result is 
statistically significant (p < .05) or not, β1 = 0.309, t(9022) 
= 2.38 for predictions regarding effect size) and with both 
team and hypotheses fixed effects (β1 = 0.089, t(9003) = 
2.78 for predictions whether the result is statistically 
significant (p < .05) or not, β1 = 0.091, t(9003) = 2.77 for 
predictions regarding effect size), and the individual 
prediction coefficient is statistically significant in these 
models as well (see Tables S5.4a and S5.5 in Supplement 
5).7 Furthermore, we estimated equations (1a) and (2a) as 
a probit model (see Table S5.4b in Supplement 5), 
obtaining similar results as those obtained using the linear 
probability model. In short, scientists were able to predict 
not only which hypotheses would receive empirical 
support (see Figure 3a) but also variability in results for the 
Note however that, as the independent variable (i.e., the 
individual forecasts) are likely to be measured with error, the 
estimated coefficients reported in this paragraph are potentially 
biased downwards. Measurement error would artificially reduce 
the correspondence between forecasts and outcomes, leading to 
a conservative test of forecaster accuracy.  
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same hypothesis based on the design choices made by 
different research teams (see Figure 3b). 
We report several further analyses of the Forecasting 
Study in Supplement 5, for the interested reader. In 
particular, we examine whether monetary incentives 
increase the accuracy of forecasts (they do not, at least with 
the relatively small incentives on offer in this study), 
whether characteristics of the forecaster, such as job rank 
and confidence in their forecasts, predict accuracy (they do 
not consistently do so), and repeat our primary analyses for 
the data from the Replication Studies and aggregating 
across the Main Studies and Replication Studies (the 
results are similar to those reported here). 
Discussion 
How contingent is support for scientific hypotheses on 
the subjective choices that researchers make when 
designing studies? Concerns about the potential 
dependency of findings on the stimuli used to capture them 
have been raised repeatedly (e.g., Baribault et al., 2018; 
Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Judd et al., 2012; Monin & 
Oppenheimer, 2014; Monin et al., 2007; Wells & 
Windschitl, 1999). In contrast, the extent to which this 
problem presents a challenge to conducting research 
investigations and interpreting research findings has never 
been directly examined. In this crowdsourced project, 
when up to 13 independent research teams designed their 
own studies to test five original research questions, 
variability in observed effect sizes proved dramatic, with 
the Bayesian analyses confirming overwhelming evidence 
of heterogeneity for four of five hypotheses and 
compelling evidence in the fifth case (see Supplement 7). 
Descriptively, different research teams designed studies 
that returned statistically significant effects in opposing 
directions for the same research question for four out of 
five hypotheses in the Main Studies, and three out of five 
hypotheses in the Replication Studies (see Supplement 9). 
In other words, even when some or most teams created 
studies that substantiated a theoretical prediction, at least 
one other team’s design found the opposite. Even the most 
consistently supported original hypotheses still exhibited a 
wide range of effect sizes, with the smallest range being d 
= -0.37 to d = 0.26 (Hypothesis 4, Replication Studies). 
While the hypothesis being tested explained substantial 
variability in effect sizes (i.e., some hypotheses received 
more consistent support than others), there remained 
substantial unexplained heterogeneity after accounting for 
the hypothesis being tested, implying that idiosyncratic 
choices in stimulus design have a very large effect on 
observed results, over and above the overall support (or 
lack thereof) for the hypothesis in question.  
Crowdsourcing makes more transparent the true 
consistency of support for a scientific prediction, and 
provides the opportunity to leverage the collective 
experience and perspectives of a crowd of scientists via 
aggregation (Bates & Granger, 1969; Galton, 1907; 
Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer, & Helbing, 2011; Silberzahn 
et al., 2018; Surowiecki, 2004). Meta-analytically 
combining effect sizes across the various conceptual 
replications yielded overall support for two of five of the 
original predictions, and a Bayesian analysis likewise 
supported two of five hypotheses. Crowdsourcing 
hypothesis tests can confirm and disconfirm predictions in 
a convincing way, by providing converging evidence 
across independent investigators who are unbiased by each 
other’s approaches or knowledge of the original finding.  
Contrary to the “flair” hypothesis (Baumeister, 2016) 
that some researchers are more adept at obtaining 
empirical support for their predictions, none of the 15 
different teams involved in this project designed studies 
associated with more consistent support for the original 
ideas. This non-effect occurred despite variable seniority 
of team leaders, who ranged from doctoral students to 
chaired full professors, with citation counts ranging from 
zero into the tens of thousands. The present findings 
further suggest that replication results are more attributable 
to the robustness and generalizability of the original 
finding than the skill of the scientist carrying out the 
replication (whether a direct or conceptual replication; 
Bench et al., 2017; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). 
Although replicating some studies certainly requires 
specialized technical knowledge (e.g., of neuroimaging 
technology), evidence that disappointing reproducibility 
rates for published research (e.g., Dewald, Thursby, & 
Anderson, 1986; Klein et al., 2014; LeBel, 2015; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015) are due to a dearth of 
replicator competence remains lacking. That said, further 
meta-scientific work is needed on the role of expertise in 
replication results (Tierney et al., 2019b).   
A substantial degree of variability in the results was 
accounted for by the original hypotheses themselves, 
which — as noted earlier — differed in their overall 
empirical support (see Figure 1). Although the original 
effects all replicated using the original materials (when 
combining the results of the Main Studies and Replication 
Studies), three effects were unsupported overall in the 
alternative study designs, in some cases returning 
estimates in the opposite direction than predicted. 
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As confirmed in the Bayesian analyses of the project 
results (Supplement 7), all five original hypotheses 
exhibited wide variability in support across different study 
designs. Although the present project was able to parse the 
two, in typical research contexts this heterogeneity in 
results due to study design choices co-exists and 
potentially interacts with heterogeneity in results due to 
population differences (McShane et al., 2019; Tiokhin et 
al., 2018). Discrepant results and variability in research 
findings (Open Science Collaboration, 2015; 
Schweinsberg et al., 2016) are perhaps unavoidable, and 
might best be embraced as a normal aspect of the scientific 
process. In terms of building solid theory, it may be 
necessary to vary stimuli and study designs (Baribault et 
al., 2018; Caruso et al., 2017; the present initiative), 
employ a variety of statistical specifications (Silberzahn et 
al., in 2018; Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2016; 
Steegen et al., 2016), and replicate findings across more 
geographic locations and populations (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010), before drawing definitive conclusions. 
With regard to communicating findings both within and 
outside the scientific community, more conservative 
messaging regarding new research conducted in a single 
population or relying heavily on a specific experimental 
paradigm seems warranted. 
Implications for the Five Original Hypotheses 
The primary goal of this initiative was to examine 
effect size dispersion when independent investigators 
design studies to address the same research questions. A 
secondary purpose was to evaluate the evidence for the five 
original effects targeted in the crowdsourced conceptual 
replications. Below we assess current support and potential 
future directions for Hypothesis 1-5, in consultation with 
the original team that volunteered each research idea for 
the initiative. 
Hypothesis 1: Awareness of automatic prejudice. This 
effect directly replicated using the original Uhlmann and 
Cunningham (2000) questionnaire items, with participants 
in both the Main Study and Replication expressing overall 
agreement to the items “Although I don't necessarily agree 
with them, I sometimes have prejudiced feelings (like gut 
reactions or spontaneous thoughts) that I don't feel I can 
prevent”, and “At times stereotypical thoughts about 
minorities coming into my head without my necessarily 
intending them to.” As in the original data collections by 
Uhlmann and Cunningham (2000), mean responses to 
these items were significantly above the neutral scale 
midpoint of four (1= strongly disagree, 4= neutral, 7= 
strongly agree). At the same time, conceptual replications 
by different research teams employing alternative 
questions failed to confirm the hypothesis that participants 
so openly self-report automatic prejudices. Aggregating 
across the different study designs via meta-analysis reveals 
no statistically significant effect in the expected direction, 
and a Bayesian analysis found moderate evidence against 
H1. On reflection, the double-barreled nature of the 
original items, invoking both lack of intentions and 
prejudiced reactions, as well as the use of qualifiers (“I 
sometimes”, “At times”) might have biased participants’ 
responses towards agreement. Further shortcomings of the 
original study design are the lack of a relative comparison 
group (e.g., non-minorities and members of dominant 
groups such as White men), and the absence of any probe 
items regarding positive or favorable thoughts.  
In sum, the present initiative to crowdsource 
hypothesis tests casts serious doubt on whether overall 
endorsement of self-perceived automatic prejudice is 
generally as high as initially reported by Uhlmann and 
Cunningham (2000). Yet, it does not call into question 
evidence that different measures of beliefs are correlated at 
an individual level with scores on implicit measures of 
attitude (Hahn et al., 2014) and that awareness of automatic 
associations can be experimentally increased (Hahn & 
Gawronski, 2019). As of yet there are no systematic 
reviews or meta-analyses on the empirical relationships 
between awareness indices and automatic associations. 
From the present crowdsourced project, we cannot 
conclude that everyday people believe themselves to be as 
biased as implicit and indirect measures of automatic 
associations suggest they are. Indeed, the present results, 
relying on a wide array of study designs, suggest they do 
not generally see themselves as implicitly prejudiced. 
Opportunities to improve validated self-report measures of 
beliefs about one’s automatic prejudices towards various 
social groups, and to use them as predictors and outcome 
measures in future investigations, remain open. 
Hypothesis 2: Extreme offers reduce trust. This 
crowdsourcing initiative found consistent evidence for 
Hypothesis 2 across the range of conceptual replications, 
as well as in the direct replications using the original 
materials. Both frequentist and Bayesian analyses 
supported this particular prediction, with the Bayesian 
analyses confirming compelling evidence for this 
hypothesis despite heterogeneity in estimates across 
different study designs. This result is consistent with a 
recent meta-analysis (Huffmeier, 2014), which found that 
“hardline” negotiation tactics (of which extreme first offers 
are one example) are associated with more negative 
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“socioemotional” outcomes in negotiations (i.e., 
perceptions that the hardline negotiator is unreasonable 
and uncooperative). However, this meta-analysis did not 
specifically examine extreme first offers or trust. Although 
our findings provide initial support for the idea that 
extreme first offers indeed reduce trust on the part of the 
recipient, that this reduced trust consequently diminishes 
information exchange, and value creation remains to be 
demonstrated. It also remains unclear to what extent such 
effects generalize across cultures. Given that negotiators in 
some cultural settings may be more accustomed to 
receiving extreme first offers than negotiators in other 
cultural settings, this effect may indeed be culturally 
moderated. This possibility is currently being examined in 
an ongoing international replication project (Schweinsberg 
et al., 2019) that will assess the cultural boundary 
conditions of this effect. 
Hypothesis 3: Moral praise for needless work. Earlier 
findings that Americans morally praise individuals who 
continue at their job after coming into sudden wealth were 
likewise confirmed by the crowdsourced initiative. 
Aggregating via meta-analysis across distinct studies 
independently created by different research teams, both the 
frequentist and Bayesian analyses find compelling 
evidence in favor of the needless work hypothesis. 
Although the robustness of the effect to different 
operationalizations is now confirmed in two large U.S. 
samples via the present host of conceptual replications, the 
original hypothesis of cross-cultural variability has yet to 
be put to a rigorous empirical test. The original research 
predicted that praise for those who work in the absence of 
any material need is steeped in the Protestant work ethic, 
and hence should be strongest among those with greater 
degrees of exposure to U.S. culture (Poehlman, 2007; 
Uhlmann et al., 2009).  
As there is no systematic literature review or meta-
analysis on this topic, an ongoing crowdsourced project by 
Tierney et al. (2019a) will attempt to directly replicate this 
and other original findings regarding work morality across 
four countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and India). Relying on a “creative destruction” 
approach to replication, the Tierney et al. (2019a) initiative 
will pit the original prediction that moral praise for 
needless work only characterizes U.S. culture against 
theories positing the general moralization of work across 
cultures, regional differences within the United States (i.e., 
New England vs. other regions; Fisher, 1989), and 
valorization of work as a means of personal fulfillment in 
post-materialist societies (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). Thus, further facets of the robustness, 
generalizability, and potential cultural boundedness of this 
effect remain to be explored in future research. For now, 
we conclude that aggregating across the crowdsourced 
study designs, the needless work hypothesis is supported 
for U.S. participants, but the originally hypothesized 
moderation by culture (Poehlman, 2007; Uhlmann et al., 
2009) remains to be demonstrated. 
Hypothesis 4: Proximal authorities drive legitimacy of 
performance enhancers. The original finding that the 
dictates of proximal authorities (e.g., the league, the 
competitive circuit) have a larger impact on judgments of 
the acceptability of using performance enhancing drugs 
(PEDs) than the law was not supported in this 
crowdsourced initiative. Although the finding directly 
replicated using the original materials, across a dozen 
different, independently-developed study designs, people 
were not more opposed to the use of PEDs when they are 
banned by a proximal authority than when they are illegal, 
and the Bayesian analysis found moderate evidence against 
this hypothesis. This result concurs with follow-up studies 
done by the research team who contributed this hypothesis 
(Landy, Walco, & Bartels, 2017), which were conducted 
after this project began. These subsequent studies find that 
both types of authority contribute to normative judgments 
of PED use, to similar degrees. There is currently no 
systematic review or meta-analysis of judgments of PED 
use, but Landy, Walco, and Bartels (2017) employed an 
exploratory, “deep-dive” methodology, in which they 
tested 11 different potential explanations for opposition to 
the use of these substances.  They concluded that PED use 
is opposed for three primary reasons: it violates moral 
norms of fairness, it poses a risk of harm to the user, and it 
tends to violate legitimate conventional rules. The present 
results help to clarify this last reason, by showing that the 
precise source of those rules - the law or a more proximal 
authority - does not affect levels of opposition. 
Hypothesis 5: Deontological judgments predict 
happiness. Although the original pattern of results once 
again directly replicated using the original materials, the 
hypothesis that individuals who tend to make 
deontological (vs. utilitarian) judgments report different 
levels of personal happiness was not supported overall by 
the crowdsourced conceptual replications. Although a 
statistically significant directional effect in support of H5 
was reported in the Main Studies, the aggregated estimate 
was close to zero, and the effect did not reach statistical 
significance in the Replication Studies. Overall, the 
Bayesian analysis found strong evidence against this 
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original prediction. There has not previously been a 
systematic review or meta-analysis of the relationship 
between moral stance and happiness, though prior research 
has linked both processes to emotional and intuitive 
responding (e.g., Everett et al., 2016; Greene, 2013; 
Lieberman, 2013; Phillips et al., 2017; Singer, 2005). 
These results fail to find support for an association between 
deontological moral judgments and hedonic happiness that 
has been suggested – although not empirically confirmed 
– by this prior work. Although laypeople appear to believe 
that part of what brings happiness is living a moral life 
(Phillips et al., 2017; Phillips et al., 2014), adherence to 
deontological vs. utilitarian ethical principles does not 
seem to relate to one’s overall happiness. 
Forecasting Findings 
Scientists can predict whether a published finding will 
replicate from the research reports (Camerer et al., 2016; 
Dreber et al., 2015) and benchmark findings plus the 
materials for further experimental conditions (DellaVigna 
& Pope, 2018a, 2018b). We find that examination of the 
materials for an unpublished study is sufficient for 
scientists to successfully anticipate the outcome. In our 
forecasting survey, predictions by independent scientists 
were significantly correlated with both effect sizes and 
whether the observed results were statistically significant 
in the hypothesized direction, and the average predictions 
were similar to the observed outcomes. Monetary 
incentives failed to improve forecasters’ predictive 
performance. Although speculative, it is possible that 
scientists who opted into and completed an extensive 
survey about predicting research findings were sufficiently 
intrinsically motivated to be accurate, so external 
incentives did not further increase their motivation (see 
Lakhani & Wolf, 2005, and Lakhani, Jeppesen, Lohse, & 
Panetta, 2007, regarding the tendency for crowdsourced 
initiatives to leverage intrinsic motivations). Another 
potential explanation is that the financial incentives (up to 
$60) were not sufficiently strong to affect accuracy.  
Comparatively more senior academics (in terms of job 
rank) were more accurate at forecasting statistical 
significance levels (i.e., whether the study’s outcome 
would be p < .05 in the predicted direction or not), but not 
effect sizes (see Supplement 5). Other indices of scientific 
eminence, such as number of peer reviewed publications, 
were unrelated to forecasting accuracy. In a separate 
investigation, DellaVigna and Pope (2018a) found that 
more senior academics (in terms of job rank and citations), 
if anything, underperformed junior academics at predicting 
how different incentives would influence the effort and 
performance of experimental subjects. Moreover, 
academics in general did no better than lay people 
(undergraduates, MBA students, and MTurk workers) at 
rank-ordering the effectiveness of different experimental 
treatments (DellaVigna & Pope, 2018a). More research is 
needed on whether traditional indices of scientific 
eminence (Sternberg, 2016; Vazire, 2017) are associated 
with any advantage in designing or predicting the results 
of scientific studies.  
Unique to the present study, we show that independent 
scientists are not only able to predict study results with 
some success by merely examining the materials, but are 
also sensitive to how design choices influence the degree 
of empirical support for a specific claim. Forecasters 
predicted research results with significant accuracy not just 
across but also within each of the five hypotheses. This 
suggests some fine-grained sensitivity to how different 
operationalizations of the same hypothesis can impact 
results. More forecasting surveys and other tools 
aggregating beliefs such as prediction markets are needed 
to determine the accuracy of scientists’ intuitions about 
how contextual factors affect research outcomes— for 
instance, whether scientists are able to anticipate cultural 
differences in effects, and whether specializing in research 
on culture confers any special advantage. Ongoing projects 
from our group examine whether academics can predict the 
heterogeneity statistics in replication results for prime-to-
behavior effects (Tierney et al., 2019b), differences in 
replication effect sizes when the same experiment is run in 
multiple laboratories (Schweinsberg et al., 2019), and 
whether findings from the field of strategic management 
generalize to other time periods and geographies (Delios et 
al., 2019). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
This project represents an early foray into the 
crowdsourcing of stimulus selection and study designs (see 
also Baribault et al., 2018), with important limitations that 
should be addressed in future initiatives. The primary 
meta-scientific purpose of this initiative was to examine 
the impact of scientists’ design choices on effect size 
estimates. Still, a number of aspects of our approach may 
have led to artificial homogeneity in study designs. In 
particular, materials designers were restricted to creating 
simple experiments with a self-reported dependent 
measure that could be run online in five minutes or less. 
Further, the key statistical test of the hypothesis had to be 
a simple comparison between two conditions (for 
Hypotheses 1-4), or a Pearson correlation (for Hypothesis 
5). Full thirty-minute- to hour-long-laboratory paradigms 
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with factorial designs, research confederates, and more 
complex manipulations and outcome measures (e.g., 
behavioral measures) contain far more researcher choice 
points and may be associated with even greater 
heterogeneity in research results. In addition, the project 
coordinators recruited the materials designers from their 
own social networks, potentially biasing the project 
towards demographic and intellectual homogeneity 
(Ibarra, 1995, 1997). Future initiatives should recruit 
materials designers more broadly, to better represent the 
diversity of perspectives within a field or subfield 
(McGuire, 1973; Monin et al., 2007; Duarte, Crawford, 
Stern, Haidt, Jussim, & Tetlock, 2015). 
Another limitation is that our participants all 
participated in tests of multiple research questions. In 
meta-analysis, it is typically assumed that all samples are 
independent of one another, but this assumption is violated 
in our data. This assumption is not problematic in the 
univariate meta-analyses that we present in the main text, 
but it does complicate the multivariate meta-analysis we 
present in Supplement 8. Future crowdsourced initiatives 
could perhaps assign each participant to only one research 
design, or focus exclusively on a single research question, 
to avoid these participant-level correlations across 
hypotheses, which are not accounted for in our primary 
analyses. This would allow for a straightforward 
multivariate meta-analytic approach, in which participants 
are nested within designs, which are nested within 
hypotheses. Each research team was also free to develop 
their own dependent measures, which meant that we could 
not directly compare raw results across different designs, 
but could only compare standardized effect sizes. Future 
projects in this vein might constrain dependent measures 
to allow clean, straightforward comparisons of the effects 
of multiple, independently developed experimental 
manipulations. 
This initiative to crowdsource hypothesis tests also 
targeted only five original hypotheses, leaving us unable to 
identify which features of a research idea might be 
associated with more or less heterogeneity in study designs 
and outcomes. Some research ideas may naturally feature 
a greater latitude of construal (Beck, McCauley, Segal, & 
Hershey, 1988; Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989), 
leading different teams to create more varied experimental 
paradigms in order to test them. In the extreme, hypotheses 
that are theoretically underspecified (unlike the present 
H1-H5) may result in a chaos of operationalizations as the 
materials designers impose their own priors and 
assumptions on the idea. Thus, one way to reduce the role 
of subjective researcher choices in research outcomes may 
be to more fully flesh out the underlying theory at the 
outset (Dijksterhuis, 2014; McGuire, 1973; Stroebe & 
Strack, 2014). 
Our limited number of target hypotheses also means 
one cannot generalize the present results to all hypotheses 
in all subfields. We cannot conclude that only 40% of 
research ideas that directly replicate will be supported in 
conceptual replications, or that for the majority of research 
questions different designs will return statistically 
significant effects in opposing directions. Those are the 
results of this project only, and further initiatives to 
crowdsource hypothesis tests are needed before drawing 
definitive conclusions about the impact of subjective 
researcher choices on empirical outcomes.  
Perhaps the most concrete methodological limitation 
of the present project was the modest sample of forecasters 
(N = 141), which reduced the statistical power of the 
relevant analyses. Our sample size was comparable to 
those for prior surveys examining the forecasting abilities 
of academics. For example, DellaVigna and Pope (2018a, 
2018b) recruited 208 academics for their forecasting 
research, Dreber et al. (2015) had 47 and 45 active traders 
in their two prediction markets for replications, Camerer et 
al.’s (2016) prediction market had 97 participants, Forsell 
et al. (in press) included 78 participants, and Camerer et al. 
(2018) featured two conditions with 114 and 92 
participants in each treatment. For the present project, we 
recruited the largest sample we could, given our 
forecasters’ massive task of reviewing, making quality 
assessments, and predicting the results from 64 distinct sets 
of experimental materials. Still, the relatively small group 
of forecasters in our survey indeed limits our conclusions. 
Furthermore, there may be overlap between the samples of 
forecasters included in this and other studies, as they were 
recruited by similar methods. Further research is needed 
using higher-powered designs, especially with regards to 
the potential role of forecaster characteristics in 
moderating predictive accuracy. 
Finally, the crowdsourcing hypothesis tests approach 
shares certain costs and benefits with other crowd 
approaches to scientific research (Uhlmann et al., in press). 
In comparison to the standard approach of relying on a 
small team, recruiting a crowd of collaborators enables big 
science, democratizes access to projects, and more 
effectively assesses the robustness of the findings. Yet at 
the same time, crowdsourcing study designs is inefficient, 
in that for the same effort and expense, initial evidence for 
a far greater number of interesting ideas could have been 
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obtained using a small team or solo investigator approach. 
In future work, the return on investment from 
crowdsourcing hypothesis tests may be greatest for 
theoretically important findings that are well established 
with a specific paradigm, and whose robustness to 
alternative methodological approaches is of general 
interest. 
Conclusions 
The present crowdsourced project illustrates the 
dramatic consequences of researcher design choices for 
scientific results. This initiative also provides a roadmap 
for future crowdsourced approaches to testing the 
generality of scientific theories. If a scientific prediction is 
theoretically important enough, or has practically 
significant policy and societal implications, future 
investigations could assign it to multiple laboratories to 
independently operationalize and carry out empirical tests. 
The extent to which the results converge (and diverge) 
across investigations can then be used to inform discussion 
and debate, revise theory, and formulate policy.  
Scientists craft theories with the ambitious goal of 
unifying potentially disparate findings into coherent, 
generalizable structures of knowledge. This process is 
often arduous and lengthy and may be impeded by features 
of the standard approach to scientific inquiry. Nonetheless, 
this process can be streamlined through collective action. 
As the present investigation demonstrates, bringing many 
perspectives and operationalizations to bear on hypotheses 
provides a richer account of phenomena than would occur 
if researchers and teams worked in isolation. Moreover, we 
also showed that independent researchers are able to 
identify not only the hypotheses that are more likely to be 
supported by an empirical investigation but also the 
research designs that, within a specific hypothesis, are 
more likely to lead to significant effect. This suggests that 
researchers can determine the features of the hypotheses, 
of the methods, and of the research designs that are 
systematically associated with the effect size and the 
statistical significance of a research question. Through 
crowdsourced collaborations such as this one, researchers 
can craft theories with more confidence and better 
understand just how far they extend. 
 
References 
Alogna, V. K., Attaya, M. K., Aucoin, P., Bahník, Š., Birch, S., 
Birt, A. R., … Zwaan, R. A. (2014). Registered replication 
report: Schooler & Engstler-Schooler (1990). Perspectives 
on Psychological Science, 9(5), 556-578. 
Ames, D. R., & Mason, M. F. (2015). Tandem anchoring: 
Informational and politeness effects of range offers in social 
exchange. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
108(2), 254–274. 
Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of severity of 
initiation on liking for a group. Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 59, 177–181. 
Banaji, M. R. (2001). Implicit attitudes can be measured. In H. 
L. Roediger III, J. S. Nairne, I. Neath, & A. M. Surprenant 
(Eds.), The nature of remembering: Essays in honor of Robert 
G. Crowder (pp. 117–150). Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association.  
Baribault, B., Donkin, C., Little, D. R., Trueblood, J. S., 
Oravecz, Z., Van Ravenzwaaij, D., ... & Vandekerckhove, J. 
(2018). Metastudies for robust tests of theory. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 115(11), 2607-2612. 
Bartko, J. J. (1976). On various intraclass correlation reliability 
coefficients. Psychological Bulletin, 83, 762-765. 
Bates, J. M., & Granger, C. W. J. (1969). The combination of 
forecasts. Operational Research Quarterly, 20, 451‐468. 
Baumeister, R. F. (2016). Charting the future of social 
psychology on stormy seas: Winners, losers, and 
recommendations. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 66, 153-158. 
Beck, L., McCauley, C., Segal, M., & Hershey, L. (1988). 
Individual differences in prototypicality judgments about 
trait categories. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 55, 286-292. 
Belsie, L., (2011). Powerball numbers: Why do lottery winners 
keep working? The Christian Science Monitor. Available at: 
https://www.csmonitor.com/Business/new-
economy/2011/0602/Powerball-numbers-Why-do-lottery-
winners-keep-working 
Bench, S. W., Rivera, G. N., Schlegel, R. J., Hicks, J. A., & 
Lench, H. C. (2017). Does expertise matter in replication? An 
examination of the Reproducibility Project: Psychology. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 68, 181-184. 
Bentham, J. (1970). An introduction to the principles of morals 
and legislation. London: Althone Press (Original work 
published 1823). 
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H. 
R. (2009). Introduction to meta-analysis. Chichester (UK): 
Wiley. 
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J., & Rothstein, H. R. 
(2010). A basic introduction to fixed‐effect and random‐
effects models for meta‐analysis. Research Synthesis 
Methods, 1, 97-111. 
Brandt, M. J., Ijzerman, H., Dijksterhuis, A., Farach, F., Geller, 
J., Giner-Sorolla, R., … van 't Veer, A. (2014). The 
replication recipe: What makes for a convincing replication? 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 217-224. 
Brehm, J. W. (1956). Post decision changes in the desirability of 
alternatives. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 
52(3), 384-389. 
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T. H., Huber, J., 
Johannesson, M., … Wu, H. (2016). Evaluating replicability 
of laboratory experiments in economics. Science, 351, 1433–
1436. 
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Holzmeister, F., Ho, T-H., Huber, J., 
Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M., Nave, G., Nosek, B. A., 
Pfeiffer, T., Altmejd, A., Buttrick, N., Chan, T., Chen, Y., 
Forsell, E., Gampa, A., Heikensten, E., Hummer, L., Imai, T., 
Isaksson, S., Manfredi, D., Rose, J., Wagenmakers, E-J., & 
Psychological Bulletin 
Wu, H. (2018). Evaluating replicability of social science 
experiments in Nature and Science between 2010 and 2015. 
Nature Human Behaviour, 2, 637-644. 
Campbell, D. T., & Fiske, D. W. (1959). Convergent and 
discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix. 
Psychological Bulletin, 56(2), 81-105. 
Caruso, E. M., Shapira, O., & Landy, J. F. (2017). Show me the 
money: A systematic exploration of manipulations, 
moderators, and mechanisms of priming effects. 
Psychological Science, 28, 1148-1159. 
Chandler, J., Mueller, P., & Paolacci, G. (2014). Nonnaïveté 
among Amazon Mechanical Turk workers: Consequences 
and solutions for behavioral researchers. Behavior Research 
Methods, 46(1), 112-130. 
Chandler, J., Paolacci, G., & Mueller, P. (2013). Risks and 
rewards of crowdsourcing marketplaces. In P. Michelucci 
(Ed.) Handbook of Human Computation. New York, NY: 
Sage. 
Coffman, L., & Niehaus, P. (2014). Pathways of persuasion. 
Working paper. 
Crandall, C.S., & Sherman, J.W. (2016). On the scientific 
superiority of conceptual replications for scientific progress. 
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 66, 93-99. 
Deeks, J. J., Macaskill, P., & Irwig, L. (2005). The performance 
tests of publication bias and other sample size effects in 
systematic reviews of diagnostic test accuracy was assessed. 
Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 58, 882-893. 
Delios, A., Tan, H., Wu, T., Wang, Y., Viganola, D., Gordon, 
M., Dreber, A., Johannesson, M., Pfeiffer, T., & Uhlmann, E. 
(2019). Can you step into the same river twice? Examining 
the context sensitivity of research findings from archival 
data. Project in progress. 
DellaVigna, S., & Pope, D.G. (2018a). Predicting experimental 
results: Who knows what? Journal of Political Economy, 
126, 2410-2456.  
DellaVigna, S., & Pope, D. (2018b). What motivates effort? 
Evidence and expert forecasts. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 85(2), 1029-1069. 
Dewald, W. G., Thursby, J. G., & Anderson, R. G. (1986). 
Replication in empirical economics: The journal of money, 
credit and banking project. American Economic Review, 76, 
587-603. 
Diener, E., Emmons, R.A., Larson, R.J., & Griffin, S. (1985). 
The satisfaction with life scale. Journal of Personality 
Assessment, 49, 71-75. 
Dijksterhuis, A. (2014). Welcome back theory! Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 9(1), 72-75. 
Dodge, T., Williams, K. J., Marzell, M., & Turrisi, R. (2012). 
Judging cheaters: Is substance misuse viewed similarly in the 
athletic and academic domains? Psychology of Addictive 
Behaviors, 26(3), 678-682.  
Dovidio, J. F., Kawakami, K., & Gaertner, S. L. (2002). Implicit 
and explicit prejudice and interracial interaction. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 62–68.  
Doyen, S., Klein, O., Simons, D. J., & Cleeremans, A. (2014). 
On the other side of the mirror: 
  Priming in cognitive and social psychology. Social 
Cognition, 32, 12–32. 
Dreber, A., Pfeiffer, T., Almenberg, J., Isaksson, S., Wilson, B., 
Chen, Y. Nosek B.A., & 
  Johannesson, M. (2015). Using prediction markets to 
estimate the reproducibility of 
  scientific research. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 112, 15343-15347. 
Duarte, J. L., Crawford, J. T., Stern, C., Haidt, J., Jussim, L., & 
Tetlock, P. (2015). Political  
diversity will improve social and personality psychological 
science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 38, 1-13. 
Dunaway, B., Edmonds, A., & Manley, D. (2013). The folk 
probably do think what you think they think. Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, 91(3), 421-441. 
Dunning, D., Meyerowitz, J. A., & Holzberg, A. D. (1989). 
Ambiguity and self-evaluation: The  
role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self- serving assessments 
of ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 
1082-1090. 
Earp, B. D. (in press). Falsification: How does it relate to 
reproducibility? In J.-F. Morin, C. Olsson, & E. O. Atikcan 
(Eds.), Key Concepts in Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ebersole, C. R., Atherton, O. E., Belanger, A. L., Skulborstad, 
H. M., Allen, J. M., Banks, J. B., … Nosek, B. A. (2016). 
Many Labs 3: Evaluating participant pool quality across the 
academic semester via replication. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 67, 68-82. 
Egger, M., Smith, G. D., Schneider, M. & Minder, C. (1997). 
Bias in meta-analysis detected by a simple, graphical test. 
British Medical Journal, 315, 629-634. 
Everett, J.A.C., & Earp, B.D. (2015). A tragedy of the 
(academic) commons: Interpreting  the replication 
crisis in psychology as a social dilemma for early-career 
researchers. Frontiers in Psychology, 6(1152), 1-4. 
Everett, J.A.C., Pizarro, D.A., & Crockett, M.J. (2016). 
Inference of trustworthiness from  
intuitive moral judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 145(6), 772-787. 
Fazio, R. H., Jackson, J. R., Dunton, B. C., & Williams, C. J. 
(1995). Variability in automatic  
activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona-
fide pipeline? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
69, 1013–1027.  
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Festinger, L. & Carlsmith, J. M. (1959). Cognitive consequences 
of forced compliance. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 58, 203-210. 
Finkel, E. J., Eastwick, P. W., & Reis, H. T. (2015). Best research 
practices in psychology:  
Illustrating epistemological and pragmatic considerations with 
the case of relationship 
science. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 108, 275-
297. 
Finkel, E. J., Eastwick, P. E., & Reis, H. T. (2017). Replicability 
and other features of a high-quality science: Toward a 
balanced and empirical approach. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 113, 244-253. 
Fisher, D. H. (1989). Albion's seed: Four British folkways in 
America. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Fitz, N. S., Nadler, R., Manogaran, P., Chong, E. W. J., & Reiner, 
P. B. (2014). Public attitudes toward cognitive enhancement. 
Neuroethics, 7, 173-188. 
Psychological Bulletin 
Forsell, E., Viganola, D., Pfeiffer, T., Almenberg, J., Wilson, B., 
Chen, Y., Nosek, B.N., Johannesson, M. & Dreber, A. (in 
press). Predicting replication outcomes in the Many Labs 2 
study. Journal of Economic Psychology. 
Galinsky, A. D., Leonardelli, G. J., Okhuysen, G. A., & 
Mussweiler, T. (2005). Regulatory focus at the bargaining 
table: Promoting distributive and integrative success. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(8), 1087–
1098. 
Galinsky, A. D., & Mussweiler, T. (2001). First offers as 
anchors: The role of perspective-taking and negotiator focus. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(4), 657–
669. 
Galton, F. (1907). Vox Populi. Nature, 75, 450–451. 
Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2006). Associative and 
propositional processes in evaluation: An integrative review 
of implicit and explicit attitude change. Psychological 
Bulletin, 132, 692–731.  
Gelman, A., & Stern, H. (2006). The difference between 
"significant" and "not significant" is not itself statistically 
significant. The American Statistician, 60(4), 328-331. 
Giner-Sorolla, R. (2012). Science or art? How aesthetic 
standards grease the way through the 
publication bottleneck but undermine science. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 562–571. 
Greene, J. (2013). Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap 
between us and them. New York, NY: Penguin Press. 
Greenland, S. (2017). Invited commentary: The need for 
cognitive science in methodology.  
American Journal of Epidemiology 186(6), 639-646. 
Greenwald, A. G. (1975). Consequences of prejudice against the 
null hypothesis. Psychological  
Bulletin, 82, 1-20. 
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social 
cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and  
stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4–27. 
Greenwald, A. G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K. (1998). 
Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 1464–1480. 
Groh, M., Krishnan, N., McKenzie, D., & Vishwanath, T. 
(2016). The impact of soft skill training on female youth 
employment: Evidence from a randomized experiment in 
Jordan. IZA Journal of Labor and Development, 5(9), 1-23. 
Gronau, Q. F., Ly, A., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2017). Informed 
Bayesian t-tests. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Retrieved from https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.02479 
Gronau, Q. F., Sarafoglou, A., Matzke, D., Ly, A., Boehm, U., 
Marsman, M., ... Steingroever, H. (2017). A tutorial on bridge 
sampling. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 81, 80–97. 
Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2017.09.005 
Gronau, Q. F., Singmann, H., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2017). 
bridgesampling: An R package for estimating normalizing 
constants. Manuscript submitted for publication and 
uploaded to arXiv. Retrieved from 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.08162 
Gronau, Q. F., van Erp, S., Heck, D. W., Cesario, J., Jonas, K. J., 
& Wagenmakers, E.J. (2017). A Bayesian model-averaged 
meta-analysis of the power pose effect with informed and 
default priors: The case of felt power. Comprehensive Results 
in Social Psychology, 2, 123–138. 
Gunia, B. C., Swaab, R. I., Sivanathan, N., & Galinsky, A. D. 
(2013). The remarkable robustness  
of the first-offer effect: Across culture, power, and issues. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 39(12), 1547–
1558. 
Hahn, A., & Gawronski, B. (2019). Facing one’s implicit biases: 
From awareness to  
acknowledgement. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 116, 769-794. 
Hahn, A., Judd, C.M., Hirsh, H.K., & Blair, I.V. (2014). 
Awareness of implicit attitudes.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 1369–1392. 
Hendrick, C. (1990). Replications, strict replications, and 
conceptual replications: Are they important? Journal of 
Social Behavior and Personality, 5(4), 41–49. 
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest 
people in the world? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61-83. 
Higgins, J. P. T., Thompson, S. G., Deeks, J. J., & Altman, D. G. 
(2003). Measuring inconsistency in meta-analysis. British 
Medical Journal, 327, 557-560. 
Huedo-Medina, T. B., Sánchez-Meca, J., Marín-Martínez, F., & 
Botella, J. (2006). Assessing heterogeneity in meta-analysis: 
Q statistic or I2 index? Psychological Methods, 11, 193-206. 
Hunter, J. E., & Schmidt, F. L. (2000). Fixed effects vs. random 
effects meta‐analysis models: Implications for cumulative 
research knowledge. International Journal of Selection and 
Assessment, 8, 275-292. 
Ibarra, H. (1995). Race, opportunity and diversity of social 
circles in managerial managers'  
networks. Academy of Management Journal, 38(3), 673-703. 
Ibarra, H. (1997). Paving an alternate route: Gender differences 
in network strategies for  
career development. Social Psychology Quarterly, 60(1), 91-
102. 
Inglehart, R. (1997). Modernization and postmodernization: 
Cultural, economic, and  
political change in 43 societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural 
change, and democracy: The  
human development sequence. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ioannidis, J.P. (2005). Why most published research ﬁndings are 
false. PLoS Medicine. 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371
%2Fjournal.pmed.0020124 
Ioannidis, J. P. A., & Trikalinos T. A. (2007). An exploratory 
test for an excess of significant 
findings. Clinical Trials, 4, 245-253.  
JASP Team. (2018). JASP (Version 0.9.2.0)[Computer 
software]. Retrieved from https://jasp-stats.org/ 
Jordan, J.J., Hoffman, M., Bloom, P., & Rand, D.G. (2016). 
Third-party punishment as a costly 
signal of trustworthiness. Nature, 530, 473-476. 
Judd, C. M., Westfall, J., & Kenny, D. A. (2012). Treating 
stimuli as a random factor in social 
psychology: A new and comprehensive solution to a pervasive 
but largely ignored 
problem. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103, 54-
69. 
Psychological Bulletin 
Kahane, G. (2015). Sidetracked by trolleys: Why sacrificial 
moral dilemmas tell us little (or nothing) about utilitarian 
judgment. Social Neuroscience, 10(5), 551-560. 
Kahneman, D., Diener, E., & Schwarz, N., eds. (1999). Well-
being: The foundations of hedonic psychology. New York, 
NY: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Kant, I. (1993). Grounding of the metaphysics of morals, 3rd ed. 
Trans. J.W. Ellington. Indianapolis: Hackett (Original work 
published 1775). 
Kirby, K. N., & Gerlanc, D. (2013). BootES: An R package for 
bootstrap confidence intervals on effect sizes. Behavior 
Research Methods, 45, 905-927. 
Klein, R. A., Ratliff, K. A., Vianello, M., Adams, R. B., Jr., 
Bahník, Š., Bernstein, M. J., … Nosek, B. A. (2014). 
Investigating variation in replicability: A "many labs" 
replication project. Social Psychology, 45(3), 142–152. 
Lakhani, K. R. & Wolf, R. G. (2005). Why hackers do what they 
do: Understanding motivation  
and effort in free/open source software projects. In J. Feller, B. 
Fitzgerald, S. Hissam, & K. R. Lakhani (Eds.), Perspectives 
on free and open source software, pp. 3-21. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Lakhani, K. R., Jeppesen, L. B., Lohse, P. A., & Panetta, J. A. 
(2007). The value of openness in  
scientific problem solving. Division of Research, Harvard 
Business School. 
Landy, J. F., Walco, D. K., & Bartels, D. M. (2017). What’s 
wrong with using steroids? Exploring whether and why 
people oppose the use of performance-enhancing drugs. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113, 377-392. 
LeBel, E. P. (2015, October 13). A list of successful and 
unsuccessful high-powered direct 
replications of social psychology findings. 
https://proveyourselfwrong.wordpress.com/2015/10/13/a-list-
of-successful-and-unsucces 
sful-high-powered-direct-replications-of-social-psychology-
findings/ 
LeBel, E. P., McCarthy, R. J., Earp, B. D., Elson, M., & 
Vanpaemel, W. (2018). A unified  
framework to quantify the credibility of scientific findings. 
Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological 
Science, 1(3), 389-402. 
Lieberman, M.D. (2013). Social: Why our brains are wired to 
connect. New York, NY: Crown  
Publishers. 
Loschelder, D. D., Swaab, R. I., Trötschel, R., & Galinsky, A. D. 
(2014). The first-mover  
disadvantage: The folly of revealing compatible preferences. 
Psychological Science, 25(4), 954–962. 
Loschelder, D. D., Trötschel, R., Swaab, R. I., Friese, M., & 
Galinsky, A. D. (2016). The  
information-anchoring model of first offers: When moving first 
helps versus hurts negotiators. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 101(7), 995–1012. 
Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F., & Helbing, D. (2011). 
How social influence can  
undermine the wisdom of crowd effect. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of  
Sciences, 108, 9020–9025. 
Ma, D. S., Correll, J., & Wittenbrink, B. (2015). The Chicago 
face database: A free stimulus set of faces and norming 
data. Behavior Research Methods, 47, 1122-1135. 
Maaravi, Y., & Levy, A. (2017). When your anchor sinks your 
boat: Information asymmetry in  
distributive negotiations and the disadvantage of making the ﬁrst 
oﬀer. Judgment and Decision Making, 12(5), 420–429. 
Makel, M.C., Plucker, J.A., & Hegarty, B. (2012). Replications 
in psychology research how 
often do they really occur? Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 7(6), 537–542. 
McGuire, W. J. (1973). The yin and yang of progress in social 
psychology: Seven koan. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 26(3), 446-456. 
McGuire, W.J. (1983). A contextualist theory of knowledge: Its 
implications for innovations and  
reform in psychological research. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), 
Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology (Vol. 16, pp. 1-47). New York, NY: 
Academic Press. 
McShane, B.B., & Gelman, A. (2017). Abandon statistical 
significance. Nature, 551(7682), 558.  
McShane, B. B., Tackett, J. L., Böckenholt, U., & Gelman, A. 
(2019). Large scale replication  
projects in contemporary psychological research. The American 
Statistician, 73, 99-105. 
Meng, X.-L., & Wong, W. H. (1996). Simulating ratios of 
normalizing constants via a simple identity: A theoretical 
exploration. Statistica Sinica, 6, 831–860. 
Mill, J. S. (1861/2004). Utilitarianism and other essays. London, 
UK: Penguin Books. 
Monin, B., & Oppenheimer, D.M. (2014). The limits of direct 
replications and the virtues of 
stimulus sampling [Commentary on Klein et al., 2014]. Social 
Psychology, 45, 299-300. 
Monin, B., Pizarro, D., & Beer, J. (2007). Deciding vs. reacting: 
Conceptions of moral judgment 
and the reason-affect debate. Review of General Psychology, 
11(2), 99-111.  
Morey, R. D., & Rouder, J. N. (2015). BayesFactor 0.9.111. 
Comprehensive R Archive Network. Retrieved from 
http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/BayesFactor/index.html 
Morris, S. B. & DeShon, R. P. (2002). Combining effect size 
estimates in meta-analysis with repeated measures and 
independent-group designs. Psychological Methods, 7, 105-
125. 
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous 
phenomenon in many guises. Review of General Psychology, 
2(2), 175-220. 
Nosek, B. A., Ebersole, C. R., DeHaven, A. C., & Mellor, D. T. 
(2018). The preregistration  
revolution. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
115(11), 2600-2606. 
Nosek, B. A., Spies, J. R., & Motyl, M. (2012). Scientific utopia: 
II. Restructuring incentives and  
practices to promote truth over publishability. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 
615-631. 
Open Science Collaboration (2015). Estimating the 
reproducibility of psychological science. 
Science, 349(6251). 
Psychological Bulletin 
Pashler, H. & Harris, C. (2012). Is the replicability crisis 
overblown? Three arguments 
examined. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 531-536. 
Pfeiffer, T., Bertram, L., & Ioannidis, J. (2011). Quantifying 
selective reporting and the Proteus phenomenon for multiple 
datasets with similar bias. PLOS ONE, 6, e18362. 
Phillips, J., De Freitas, J., Mott, C., Gruber, J., & Knobe, J. 
(2017). True happiness: The role of morality in the folk 
concept of happiness. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 146(2), 165-181. 
Poehlman, T.A. (2007). Ideological inheritance: Implicit 
Puritanism in American moral cognition. Doctoral 
dissertation, Yale University.  
R Core Team. (2018). R: A language and environment for 
statistical computing [Computer software manual]. Vienna, 
Austria. Retrieved from https://www.R-project.org/ 
Riley, R. D., Price, M. J., Jackson, D., Wardle, M., Gueyffier, F., 
Wang, J., … White, I. R. (2015). Multivariate meta-analysis 
using individual participant data. Research Synthesis 
Methods, 6(2), 157–174. doi:10.1002/jrsm.1129 
Rosenthal, R. (1979). The "file drawer problem" and the 
tolerance for null results. Psychological  
Bulletin, 86(3), 638-641. 
Rosenthal, R., & DiMatteo, M. R. (2001). Meta-analysis: Recent 
developments in quantitative methods for literature reviews. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 52, 59-82. 
Ryff, C. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Explorations 
on the meaning of psychological well-being. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 57(6), 1069-1081. 
Sanders, M., Mitchell, F., & Chonaire, A.N. (2015). Just 
common sense? How well do experts  
and lay-people do at predicting the ﬁndings of behavioural 
science experiments. Working 
paper. 
Sattler, S., Forlini, C., Racine, E., & Sauer, C. (2013). Impact of 
contextual factors and substance  
characteristics on perspectives toward cognitive enhancement. 
PLOS ONE, 8(8), e71542. 
Scheibehenne, B., Gronau, Q. F., Jamil, T., & Wagenmakers, E.-
J. (2017). Fixed or random? A resolution through model-
averaging. Reply to Carlsson, Schimmack, Williams, and 
Burkner. Psychological Science, 28, 1698–1701. 
Scheske, C. & Schnall, S. (2012). The ethics of “smart drugs”: 
Moral judgments about healthy  
people’s use of cognitive-enhancing drugs. Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology, 34, 508-515. 
Schimmack, U. (2012). The ironic effect of significant results on 
the credibility of multiple study articles. Psychological 
Methods, 17(4), 551-566. 
Schmidt, S. (2009). Shall we really do it again? The powerful 
concept of replication is neglected  
in the social sciences. Review of General Psychology, 13(2), 90-
100. 
Schweinsberg, M. (2013). Starting high shrinks the pie. 
Unpublished raw data. 
Schweinsberg, M., Madan, N., Vianello, M., Sommer, S. A., 
Jordan, J., Tierney, W., … Uhlmann, E. L. (2016). The 
pipeline project: Pre-publication independent replications of 
a single laboratory’s research pipeline. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 66, 55-67. 
Schweinsberg, M., Ku, G., Wang, C. S., & Pillutla, M. M. 
(2012). Starting high and ending with nothing: The role of 
anchors and power in negotiations. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 48(1), 226–231. 
Schweinsberg, M., Viganola, D., Prasad, V., Dreber, A., 
Johannesson, M., Pfeiffer, T., Tierney,  
W.T., Eitan, O. … & Uhlmann, E.L. (2019). The pipeline project 
2: Opening pre-publication independent replication to the 
world. Project in progress. 
Silberzahn, R., & Uhlmann, E.L. (2015). Many hands make tight 
work: Crowdsourcing research  
can balance discussions, validate findings and better inform 
policy. Nature, 526, 189-191. 
Silberzahn, R., Uhlmann, E. L., Martin, D. P., Anselmi, P., Aust, 
F., Awtrey, E., ... & Carlsson, R. (2018). Many analysts, one 
data set: Making transparent how variations in analytic 
choices affect results. Advances in Methods and Practices in 
Psychological Science, 1(3), 337-356. 
Simons, D. J. (2014). The value of direct replication. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science,  
9(1), 76-80. 
Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2014). P-
Curve: A key to the file drawer. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 534-547. 
Simonsohn, U., Simmons, J., & Nelson, L. (2016). Specification 
curve: Descriptive and 
inferential statistics for all plausible specifications. Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Singer, P. (2005). Ethics and intuitions. Journal of Ethics, 9, 
331-352. 
Sowden, W. & Hall, M. (2015). Exploring the relationship 
between morality and happiness. Unpublished raw data. 
Stan Development Team. (2018). RStan: the R interface to Stan. 
Retrieved from http://mc-stan.org/ (R package version 
2.17.3) 
Steegen, S., Tuerlinckx, F., Gelman, A., & Vanpaemel, W. 
(2016). Increasing transparency 
through a multiverse analysis. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 11(5), 702 –712. 
Sternberg, R. J. (2016). “Am I famous yet?” Judging scholarly 
merit in psychological 
science an introduction. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
11(6), 877-881. 
Stewart, N., Ungemach, C., Harris, A. J. L., Bartels, D. M., 
Newell, B. R., Paolacci, G., & Chandler, J. (2015). The 
average laboratory samples a population of 7,300 Amazon 
Mechanical Turk Workers. Judgment and Decision Making, 
10, 479-491. 
Stroebe, W., & Strack, F. (2014). The alleged crisis and the 
illusion of exact replication.  
Perspectives in Psychological Science, 9, 59–71. 
Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds. New York, NY: 
Random House. 
Tierney, W., Ebersole, C., Hardy, J., Chapman, H., Gantman, A., 
Vanaman, M., DeMarree, K.,  
Wylie, J., Storbeck J., & Uhlmann, E. L. (2019a). A creative 
destruction approach to replication. Registered Report 
proposal under review. 
Tierney, W.T., Viganola, Ebersole, C., Hardy, J., D., Gordon, 
M., Dreber, A., Johannesson, M., Pfeiffer, T., Molden, D., 
Grossman, I., Bauman, C., DeMarree, K., Devos, T., Huynh, 
Psychological Bulletin 
Q., Bozo, J., Diermeier, D., Heinze, J., & Uhlmann, E. L. 
(2019b). Replication ring for priming effects on judgments 
and behaviors. Registered Report proposal in preparation. 
Tiokhin, L., Hackman, J., Munira, S., Jesmin, K., Hruschka, D. 
(2019). Generalizability is not optional: insights from a cross-
cultural study of social discounting. Royal Society Open 
Science, 6(2), 181386. 
Turiel, E. (1983). The development of social knowledge: 
Morality and convention. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Turiel, E. (2002). The culture of morality. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under 
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 
1124–1131. 
Uhlmann, E. L., & Cunningham, W.A. (2000). Awareness of 
automatic prejudice. Unpublished  
raw data. 
Uhlmann, E.L., Ebersole, C., Chartier, C., Errington, T., 
Kidwell, M., Lai, C.K., McCarthy, R.,  
Riegelman, A., Silberzahn, R., & Nosek, B.A. (in press). 
Scientific Utopia III: Crowdsourcing Science. Perspectives 
on Psychological Science. 
Uhlmann, E. L., Poehlman, T. A., & Nosek, B. A. (2012). 
Automatic associations: Personal  
attitudes or cultural knowledge? In J. Hanson (Ed.), Ideology, 
psychology, and law (pp. 228–260). Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.  
Uhlmann, E.L., Pizarro, D., & Diermeier, D. (2015). A person-
centered approach to moral judgment. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 10, 72-81. 
Uhlmann, E.L., Poehlman, T.A., & Bargh, J.A. (2009). 
American moral exceptionalism. In J.T. 
Jost, A.C. Kay, & H. Thorisdottir (Eds.) Social and 
Psychological Bases of Ideology and System Justification. 
(pp. 27-52). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Uhlmann, E.L., & Sanchez-Burks, J. (2014). The implicit legacy 
of American Protestantism. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 45, 991-1005.  
Van Bavel, J. J., Mende-Siedlecki, P., Brady, W. J., & Reinero, 
D. A. (2016). Contextual sensitivity in scientific 
reproducibility. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 113, 6454-6459. 
van den Bergh, D., van Doorn, J., Marsman, M., Draws, T., van 
Kesteren, E., Derks, K., ... Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2019). How 
to interpret the output of a Bayesian ANOVA in JASP. In 
preparation. 
van Erp, S., Verhagen, J., Grasman, R. P. P. P., & Wagenmakers, 
E.-J. (2017). Estimates of between-study heterogeneity for 
705 meta-analyses reported in Psychological Bulletin from 
1990–2013. Journal of Open Psychology Data, 5(1), 4. 
Retrieved from http://doi.org/10.5334/jopd.33 
Vazire, S. (2017). Our obsession with eminence warps research. 
Nature, 547, 7. 
Verhagen, A. J., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2014). Bayesian tests to 
quantify the result of a  
replication attempt. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 143, 1457-1475. 
Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the 
metafor package. Journal of Statistical Software, 36, 1-48. 
Wagenmakers, E.-J., Love, J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., 
Verhagen, A. J., ... Morey, R. D. (2018). Bayesian inference 
for psychology. Part II: Example applications with JASP. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(1), 58–76. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1323-7 
Wagenmakers, E.-J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., Verhagen, 
A. J., Love, J., ... Morey, R. D. (2018). Bayesian inference 
for psychology. Part I: Theoretical advantages and practical 
ramifications. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25(1), 35–57. 
doi: 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1343-3 
Wagenmakers, E.-J., Wetzels, R., Borsboom, D., van der Maas, 
H.L.J. & Kievit, R.A. (2012). 
An agenda for purely confirmatory research. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 
7(6), 632-638.  
Waterman, A.S. (1993). Two conceptions of happiness: contrasts 
of personal expressiveness (eudaimonia) and hedonic 
enjoyment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
64, 678–91. 
Waterman, A.S.., Schwartz, S.J., Zamboanga, B.L., Ravert, R.D. 
Williams, M.K., Agocha, V.B., Kim, S.Y., & Donnellan, B. 
(2010). The questionnaire for eudaimonic well-being: 
Psychometric properties, demographic comparisons, and 
evidence of validity. The Journal of Positive Psychology, 
5(1), 41-61. 
Watson, D., & Clark, LA. (1988). Development and validation 
of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The 
PANAS Scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070.  
Wells, G. L., & Windschitl, P. D. (1999). Stimulus sampling in 
social psychological 
experimentation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
25, 1115-1125. 
Westfall, J., Judd, C. M., & Kenny, D. A. (2015). Replicating 
studies in which samples of participants respond to samples 
of stimuli. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(3), 
390-399.  
Wicherts, J. M., Veldkamp, C. L., Augusteijn, H. E., Bakker, M., 
Van Aert, R., & Van Assen, M. A. (2016). Degrees of 
freedom in planning, running, analyzing, and reporting 
psychological studies: A checklist to avoid p-hacking. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1832.  
Wilson, T. D., Lindsey, S., & Schooler, T. Y. (2000). A model 
of dual attitudes. Psychological  
Review, 107, 101–126.  
Wuchty, S., Jones, B. F., & Uzzi, B. (2007a). The increasing 
dominance of teams in the  
production of knowledge. Science, 316, 1036–1038. 
Wuchty, S., Jones, B., & Uzzi, B. (2007b). Why do team 
authored papers get cited more? Science, 317, 1496-1497. 
Zwaan, R. A., Etz, A., Lucas, R. E., & Donnellan, M. B. (2018). 
Making replication mainstream. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 41, e120. 
Psychological Bulletin 
 Table 1. Directional and nondirectional formulations of the five hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 
Directional: People explicitly self-report an awareness of harboring negative automatic 
associations with members of negatively stereotyped social groups. 
Nondirectional: When directly asked, do people explicitly self-report an awareness of 
harboring negative automatic associations with members of negatively stereotyped social 
groups? 
Hypothesis 2 
Directional: Negotiators who make extreme first offers are trusted less, relative to negotiators 
who make moderate first offers. 
Nondirectional: Are negotiators who make extreme first offers trusted more, less, or the same 
relative to negotiators who make moderate first offers? 
Hypothesis 3 
Directional: A person continuing to work despite having no material/financial need to work 
has beneficial effects on moral judgments of that individual. 
Nondirectional: What are the effects of continuing to work despite having no 
material/financial need to work on moral judgments of that individual — beneficial, 
detrimental, or no effect? 
Hypothesis 4 
Directional: Part of why people are opposed to the use of performance enhancing drugs in 
sports is because they are “against the rules”. But, whether the performance enhancer is against 
the rules established by a proximal authority (e.g., the league) contributes more to this 
judgment than whether it is against the law. 
Nondirectional: Part of why people are opposed to the use of performance enhancing drugs in 
sports is because they are "against the rules". But which contributes more to this judgment — 
whether the performance enhancer is against the law, or whether it is against the rules 
established by a more proximal authority (e.g., the league)? 
Hypothesis 5 
Directional: The tendency to make deontological (as opposed to utilitarian) judgments is 
positively related to personal happiness. 
Nondirectional: Is a utilitarian vs. deontological moral orientation related to personal 
happiness? 
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Table 2. Effect sizes and Q, I2, and τ2 statistics from meta-analyses of Main Studies and Replication Studies. 
Main Studies 
Hypothesis Description k Effect Size [95% CI] Q I2 [95% CI] τ2 [95% CI] 
1 Awareness of automatic prejudice 13 d = 0.07 [-0.22, 0.37] Q(12) = 897.51*** 99.08% [98.20, 99.67] 0.28 [0.14, 0.81] 
2 Extreme offers reduce trust 13 d = 1.04 [0.61, 1.47] Q(12) = 568.36*** 98.25% [96.58, 99.36] 0.61 [0.31, 1.70] 
3 Moral praise for needless work 13 d = 0.33 [0.17, 0.50] Q(12) = 152.45*** 93.55% [87.39, 97.68] 0.09 [0.04, 0.26] 
4 Proximal authorities drive legitimacy of 
performance enhancers 
12 d = 0.07 [-0.05, 0.20] Q(11) = 89.72*** 87.94% [75.82, 95.85] 0.04 [0.02, 0.13] 
5 Deontological judgments predict happiness 13 r = 0.06 [0.01, 0.11] Q(12) = 52.91*** 75.65% [52.68, 90.62] 0.01 [0.00, 0.02] 
Replication Studies 
Hypothesis Description k Effect Size [95% CI] Q I2 [95% CI] τ2 [95% CI] 
1 Awareness of automatic prejudice 13 d = -0.07 [-0.33, 0.19] Q(12) = 773.19*** 98.88% [97.81, 99.60] 0.23 [0.12, 0.64] 
2 Extreme offers reduce trust 13 d = 0.61 [0.32, 0.88] Q(12) = 372.40*** 97.09% [94.34, 98.98] 0.26 [0.13, 0.73] 
3 Moral praise for needless work 13 d = 0.24 [0.11, 0.38] Q(12) = 129.49*** 91.26% [82.81, 96.85] 0.05 [0.03, 0.16] 
4 Proximal authorities drive legitimacy of 
performance enhancers 
12 d = 0.03 [-0.06, 0.12] Q(11) = 47.45*** 78.06% [55.84, 92.65] 0.02 [0.01, 0.07] 
5 Deontological judgments predict happiness 13 r = 0.03 [-0.04, 0.09] Q(12) = 90.93*** 86.39% [73.53, 94.97] 0.01 [0.00, 0.03] 
Note. ***p < .001. 
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Figure 1a. Forest plot of observed effect sizes (independent-groups Cohen’s ds) for Hypothesis 
1. The research question was “When directly asked, do people explicitly self-report an awareness 
of harboring negative automatic associations with members of negatively stereotyped social 
groups?” 
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Figure 1b. Forest plot of observed effect sizes (independent-groups Cohen’s ds) for Hypothesis 
2. The research question was “Are negotiators who make extreme first offers trusted more, less, 
or the same relative to negotiators who make moderate first offers?” 
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Figure 1c. Forest plot of observed effect sizes (independent-groups Cohen’s ds) for Hypothesis 
3. The research question was “What are the effects of continuing to work despite having no 
material/financial need to work on moral judgments of that individual - beneficial, detrimental, 
or no effect?” 
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Figure 1d. Forest plot of observed effect sizes (independent-groups Cohen’s ds) for Hypothesis 
4. The research question was “Part of why people are opposed to the use of performance 
enhancing drugs in sports is because they are ‘against the rules’. But which contributes more to 
this judgment - whether the performance enhancer is against the law, or whether it is against the 
rules established by a more proximal authority (e.g., the league)?” 
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Figure 1e. Forest plot of observed effect sizes (converted to Cohen’s ds, for comparison to other 
hypotheses) for Hypothesis 5. The research question was “Is a utilitarian vs. deontological moral 
orientation related to personal happiness?” 
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Figure 2. Scatter plot comparing Main Study and Replication effect sizes (Cohen’s ds). Each 
point in the scatter plot consists of one of 64 study designs. The continuous segment represents 
the fitted line; the dashed segment represents the 45-degree line. H1: Awareness of automatic 
prejudice, H2: Extreme offers reduce trust, H3: Moral praise for needless work, H4: Proximal 
authorities drive legitimacy of performance enhancers, H5: Deontological judgments predict 
happiness. 
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Figure 3a. Correlation between average predicted effect size and observed effect size for each 
study design. The continuous segment represents the fitted line; the dashed segment represents y 
= x. H1: Awareness of automatic prejudice, H2: Extreme offers reduce trust, H3: Moral praise 
for needless work, H4: Proximal authorities drive legitimacy of performance enhancers, H5: 
Deontological judgments predict happiness. 
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Figure 3b. Correlation between average predicted effect size and observed effect size for each 
version of the study materials, separately for each of the five hypotheses. Continuous segments 
represent fitted lines; dashed segments represent y = x. H1: Awareness of automatic prejudice, 
H2: Extreme offers reduce trust, H3: Moral praise for needless work, H4: Proximal authorities 
drive legitimacy of performance enhancers, H5: Deontological judgments predict happiness. 
  
  
CROWDSOURCING HYPOTHESIS TESTS      35 
 
Appendix: The Crowdsourcing Hypothesis Tests Collaboration 
 
Matúš Adamkovič1, Ravin Alaei2, Casper J. Albers3, Aurélien Allard4, Ian A. Anderson5, Michael R. Andreychik6, 
Peter Babinčák7, Bradley J. Baker8, Gabriel Baník7, Ernest Baskin9, Jozef Bavolar10, Ruud M. W. J. Berkers11, 
Michał Białek12, Joel Blanke13, Johannes Breuer14, Ambra Brizi15, Stephanie E. V. Brown16, Florian Brühlmann17, 
Hendrik Bruns18, Leigh Caldwell19, Jean-François Campourcy20, Eugene Y. Chan21, Yen-Ping Chang22, Benjamin Y. 
Cheung23, Alycia Chin24*, Kit W. Cho25, Simon Columbus26, Paul Conway27, Conrad A. Corretti28, Adam W. 
Craig29, Paul G. Curran30, Alexander F. Danvers31, Ian G. J. Dawson32, Martin V. Day33, Erik Dietl34, Johannes T. 
Doerflinger35, Alice Dominici36, Vilius Dranseika37,38, Peter A. Edelsbrunner39, John E. Edlund40, Matthew Fisher41, 
Anna Fung42, Oliver Genschow43, Timo Gnambs44,45, Matthew H. Goldberg46, Lorenz Graf-Vlachy47, Andrew C. 
Hafenbrack42, Sebastian Hafenbrädl48, Andree Hartanto49, Patrick R. Heck50, Joseph P. Heffner51, Joseph Hilgard52, 
Felix Holzmeister53, Oleksandr V. Horchak54, Tina S.-T. Huang55, Joachim Hüffmeier56, Sean Hughes57, Ian 
Hussey57, Roland Imhoff58, Bastian Jaeger59, Konrad Jamro60, Samuel G. B. Johnson61, Andrew Jones62, Lucas 
Keller35, Olga Kombeiz34, Lacy E. Krueger63, Anthony Lantian64, Justin P. Laplante65, Ljiljana B. Lazarevic66, 
Jonathan Leclerc67, Nicole Legate68, James M. Leonhardt69, Desmond W. Leung70,71, Carmel A. Levitan72, Hause 
Lin2, Qinglan Liu73, Marco Tullio Liuzza74, Kenneth D. Locke75, Albert L. Ly76, Melanie MacEacheron77, 
Christopher R. Madan78, Harry Manley79, Silvia Mari80, Marcel Martončik7, Scott L. McLean81, Jonathon 
McPhetres82,83, Brett G. Mercier84, Corinna Michels43, Michael C. Mullarkey85, Erica D. Musser86, Ladislas 
Nalborczyk87,57, Gustav Nilsonne88,89, Nicholas G. Otis90, Sarah M. G. Otner91, Philipp E. Otto92, Oscar Oviedo-
Trespalacios93,94, Mariola Paruzel-Czachura95, Francesco Pellegrini96, Vitor M. D. Pereira97, Hannah Perfecto98, 
Gerit Pfuhl99, Mark H. Phillips100, Ori Plonsky101, Maura Pozzi102, Danka B. Purić66, Brett Raymond-Barker103, 
David E. Redman104, Caleb J. Reynolds27, Ivan Ropovik7, Lukas Röseler105,106, Janna K. Ruessmann43, William H. 
Ryan90, Nika Sablaturova107, Kurt J. Schuepfer108, Astrid Schütz106, Miroslav Sirota109, Matthias Stefan53, Eric L. 
Stocks110, Garrett L. Strosser111, Jordan W. Suchow112, Anna Szabelska113, Kian Siong Tey5, Leonid Tiokhin114, Jais 
Troian115, Till Utesch116, Alejandro Vásquez-Echeverría117, Leigh Ann Vaughn118, Mark Verschoor3, Bettina von 
Helversen119, Pascal Wallisch120, Sophia C. Weissgerber121, Aaron L. Wichman122, Jan K. Woike123,124, Iris Žeželj66, 
Janis H. Zickfeld125,126, Yeonsin Ahn5, Philippe F. Blaettchen5, Xi Kang5, Yoo Jin Lee5, Philip M. Parker5, Paul A. 
Parker5, Jamie S. Song5, May-Anne Very5, Lynn Wong5 
 
1University of Presov, 2University of Toronto, 3University of Groningen, 4University of Paris VIII, 5INSEAD, 
6Fairfield University, 7University of Prešov, 8University of Massachusetts, 9Saint Joseph's University, 10Pavol Josef 
Šafárik University in Košice, 11Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive & Brain Sciences, 12Kozminski 
University, 13Stockholm School of Economics, 14GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, 15Sapienza 
University of Rome, 16Texas A&M University, 17University of Basel, 18University of Hamburg, 19Irrational Agency, 
20Université Clermont Auvergne, 21Monash University, 22 Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, 
23University of British Columbia, 24Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 25University of Houston–
Downtown, 26Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 27Florida State University, 28The University of Texas at Dallas, 
29University of Kentucky, 30Grand Valley State University, 31University of Arizona, 32University of Southampton, 
33Memorial University of Newfoundland, 34Loughborough University, 35University of Konstanz, 36European 
University Institute, 37Kaunas University of Technology, 38Vilnius University, 39ETH Zurich, 40Rochester Institute 
of Technology, 41Southern Methodist University, 42University of Washington, 43University of Cologne, 44Leibniz 
Institute for Educational Trajectories, 45Johannes Kepler University Linz, 46Yale University, 47University of Passau, 
48IESE Business School, 49Singapore Management University, 50Geisinger Health System, 51Brown University, 
52Illinois State University, 53University of Innsbruck, 54Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), CIS-IUL, 
55University College London, 56TU Dortmund University, 57Department of Experimental Clinical and Health 
Psychology, Ghent University, 58Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, 59Tilburg University, 60University of 
Massachusetts Dartmouth, 61University of Bath, 62University of Liverpool, 63Texas A&M University-Commerce, 
64Université Paris Nanterre, 65Clark University, 66University of Belgrade, 67John Molson School of Business, 
  
CROWDSOURCING HYPOTHESIS TESTS      36 
 
Concordia University, 68Illinois Institute of Technology, 69University of Nevada, Reno, 70Baruch College, City 
University of New York, 71The Graduate Center, City University of New York, 72Occidental College, 73Hubei 
University, 74Magna Græcia University of Catanzaro, 75University of Idaho, 76Loma Linda University, 77University 
of Western Ontario, 78University of Nottingham, 79Chulalongkorn University, 80University of Milano - Bicocca, 
81Walden University, 82Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 83University of Regina, 84University of California, 
Irvine, 85University of Texas-Austin, 86Florida International University, 87Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, LPNC, 
38000, Grenoble, France, 88Karolinska Institutet, 89Stockholm University, 90University of California, Berkeley, 
91Imperial College Business School, 92European University Viadrina, 93Queensland University of Technology 
(QUT), 94Universidad del Norte, 95University of Silesia, 96Università degli Studi di Padova, 97LanCog, CFUL, 
Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Lisboa, Alameda da Universidade, 98Washington University in St. Louis, 
99UiT The Arctic University of Norway, 100Abilene Christian University, 101Duke University, 102Università Cattolica 
del Sacro Cuore, 103University of Roehampton, 104Pacific Lutheran University, 105Harz University of Applied 
Sciences, 106University of Bamberg, 107Masaryk University, 108Miami University, 109University of Essex, 
110University of Texas at Tyler, 111Southern Utah University, 112Stevens Institute of Technology, 113Queen's 
University Belfast, 114Eindhoven University of Technology, 115Istanbul Bilgi University, 116University of Münster, 
117University of the Republic, 118Ithaca College, 119University of Bremen, 120New York University, 121University of 
Kassel, 122Western Kentucky University, 123Max Planck Institute for Human Development, 124DIW, Berlin, 
Germany, 125University of Oslo, 126University of Mannheim, 127McGill University 
 
The first through 135th members of the Crowdsourcing Hypothesis Tests Collaboration lent their expertise as 
evaluators of study quality and forecasters. The 136th through 144th members of the Crowdsourcing Hypothesis 
Tests Collaboration lent their expertise as evaluators of study quality and forecasters in a pilot version of the 
Forecasting Study. In addition, all members of the Crowdsourcing Hypothesis Tests Collaboration, along with the 
authors whose full names are listed on the first page, revised and approved the final version of this article. 
 
*The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private 
publication or statement by any of its economic research fellows, consultants, or employees. 
 
